[ExI] teachers
efc at swisscows.email
efc at swisscows.email
Sun Aug 27 21:24:54 UTC 2023
Good evening Jason,
On Sun, 27 Aug 2023, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
> Let's break #2 into two categories:
> A) Bodily continuity
> B) Mind continuity
But what about A and B?
> For B, consider: we can make small changes to ones mind, adding a memory here, forgetting a memory there, so that, over time we could
Externally adding/deleting memories I'd say would constitute a break in
continuity.
> Then there are all the problems for which these give no good answer:
>
> For A:
>
> Why are two identical twins not the same person, when each is a continuity of the same fertilized egg (same body)?
They don't have the same A and B. Different A:s and different B:s. Just
the fact that they occupy different space and later on, will experience
different angles, etc. makes A and B diverge.
> Why would receiving a neural prosthesis not be regarded in the same way as death?
Depends on the circumstances. How is it implemented and when is it
implemented?
> For B:
>
> Why are two duplicates created by a faulty teleporter not the same person, when each is a continuity of the same mind?
They don't occupy the same space, and just by the fact of not doing
that, their minds diverge.
This is the theme of a very entertaining
science fiction short story by Lars Gustafsson
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lars_Gustafsson).
In 1989, Gustafsson ventured into the field of science fiction and published Det sällsamma djuret från norr och andra science-fiction-berättelser. The book takes place 40,000 years into the future, when humans are extinct and the galaxy is populated by artificial intelligences. It is a philosophical exploration of life and existence and can be seen as an homage to Stanislav Lem.
I don't think it is available in english, but I'd love to translate it
if I ever got the chance and permission.
> Why is total amnesia not regarded in the same way as death?
This is more of an ethical question to me and one frequently debated in
hospitals the world over.
> For both A and B:
>
> If two people are each slowly morphed into the other person, where are the two people after the procedure? Have they teleported to
> the other's location, or has each changed, but remained in the same spot? Why?
If it is cell-by-cell replacement, I see no disturbance in A and B.
> When a brain is split by cutting the corpus callosum, the result is two independently consciousness minds. Are they the same as the
> mind that was there before? If not, where did the two minds come from? If the connection were to be restored to fuse the minds, what
> happens to the two minds when they become one?
Do they have A and B continuity? If you cut the hardware, to me, it
sounds like you don't have A continuity and based on your description
(is this a real experiment? Could you please in that case, send me some
links.) doesn't sound as if you have B continuity either.
If you can fuse it together, who knows?
> If the same person can exist in the same place at the two different times, then why can't the same person exist at two different
> places at the same time?
Laws of physics? This one, I don't understand, but it is getting late
here, so I'll blame my tired brain. ;)
> When it comes to #1, it does sound philosophically unfeasible to me, since we're two selves havinga discussion. If all is
> illusion, how can there even be any knowledge at all?
>
> There would still be individual conscious states, each with they're own consciousness, but nothing (actually) connecting one to any
> other. It's consistent in my view, but unworkable as it provides no justification to doing anything since we would each be trapped in
> our own thought moment forever.
Well, let's leave #1 to the side. I think we're in agreement, perhaps
for different, but maybe not incompatible reasons, that this is
unworkable.
> When it comes to #3, I tried to google it, but it looks as if it is not a very popular stance among philosophers. Why do
> you think it is not popular?
>
> It's relatively new, and highly counter to the brain's self-imposed ego-illuision, which is hard to escape without serious
> meditation, drugs, traumatic brain injury, or logic.
I find #3 very interesting. I'm not discounting it, and I will read
through your blog again.
Best regards,
Daniel
> Jason
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, 27 Aug 2023, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
>
> The question you are asking about below concerns the topic in philosophy known as personal identity. That
> topic asks: which I
> experiences belong to which person's, in other words, how do we define the temporal borders of a person.
> There are in general three
> approaches generally taken:
> 1. No-self/Anatta/empty individualism: each observer-moment, or thought-moment is its own isolated thing,
> there's no such thing as a
> self which has multiple distinct thought-moments.
>
> 2. Continuity theories/closed individualism: either bodily or psychological continuity. A self is a
> continual things either though
> the continuation of some physical body, or some more abstractly defined psychological organization.
>
> 3. Universalism/open Individualism: There are no bodily or psychological preconditions for an experience
> being yours, all experiences
> are I, and in truth there is only one mind.
>
> I think #2 leads to contradictions. #1 and #3 are logically consistent. Between #1 and #3, #3 is more useful
> (it permits decision
> theory) and further, there are strong probabilistic arguments for it. For example, those given in "One self:
> the logic of experience"
> which I cite here:
>
> https://alwaysasking.com/is-there-life-after-death/#10_Open_Individualism_and_the_Afterlife
>
> One consequence of Open Individualism is that it dissolves any concern of whether some particular copy is
> you, as all conscious
> perspectives are you.
>
> Jason
>
>
> On Saturday, August 26, 2023, efc--- via extropy-chat <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> My position is that a separate uploaded copy of me is not me, thus would not grant the physical me
> immortality. I would
> look at it as a mind-seed, or something slightly similar to a part of me that lives on, just as a part
> of me lives on in
> a child, although actually that part is way more of me, than in a child.
>
> However, when talking about continuity and uploading, I think the ship of theseus uploading is much
> more interesting from
> an identity point of view.
>
> As some, or all of you already know, imagine that I'm uploaded neruon by neuron, over time. I would not
> have a break, and
> my mind would transition onto the new media.
>
> I would like to know what the people here who do not believe uploading grants a form of immortality
> think about that
> scenario? Would it fit in with your idea of identity and would you see yourselves being "immortal"
> through a shop of
> theseus procedure if it were possible?
>
> As for the copy approach, a starting point for me would be that my identity is probably based on my
> mind, sense of
> continuity and location. In a copy, continuity and location would go 2x, and thus not work with the
> definition of
> identity. In a theseus there would be no 2x, both continuity would be perserved, and location would be
> single.
>
> Best regards,
> Daniel
>
>
> On Sat, 26 Aug 2023, Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat wrote:
>
> On 25/08/2023 20:11, Darin Sunley wrote:
>
> An important component of what a lot of people want out of immortality is not so much
> continuity
> as it is not-experiencing-discontinuity [And no, they're not the same thing].
>
> If I'm dying of cancer, and you do a brain scan, the resulting upload will remember being
> me, but
> /I'm/ still gonna experience a painful death. And no, killing me painlessly, or even
> instantaneously, during or in the immediate aftermath of the brain scan doesn't solve the
> problem
> either.
>
> If "me" is ever on two substrates simultaneously, you may have copied me, but you haven't
> moved
> me, and a copy, by definition, isn't the me I want to be immortal.
>
>
> So this 'me' that you are talking about, must be something that, when copied, somehow changes
> into 'not-me'.
> I don't understand this. If it's an exact copy, how is it not exactly the same? How can there not
> now be two
> 'me's? Two identical beings, in every way, including their subjective experience, with no
> discontinuity with
> the original singular being?
>
> When I hit 'send' on this message, everyone on the list will get a copy, and I will keep a copy.
> Which one is
> the real message? If they were conscious, why would that make any difference?
>
> You say "you may have copied me, but you haven't moved me". But how do you move data? You make a
> second copy
> of it then delete the first copy. So destroying copy 1 when copy 2 is made would be 'moving me',
> yet you say
> it wouldn't. Can you clarify why? I can't see (short of a belief in an uncopyable supernatural
> 'soul') how
> this could be.
>
> This is a crucial point, for those of us interested in uploading, so I think we should really
> understand it,
> yet it makes no sense to me. Would you please explain further?
>
> Could you also please explain the comment about continuity and not-discontinuity not being the
> same thing?
>
> Ben
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