[ExI] teachers
Jason Resch
jasonresch at gmail.com
Sun Aug 27 23:13:26 UTC 2023
On Sun, Aug 27, 2023, 5:26 PM efc--- via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> Good evening Jason,
>
> On Sun, 27 Aug 2023, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
>
> > Let's break #2 into two categories:
> > A) Bodily continuity
> > B) Mind continuity
>
> But what about A and B?
>
I am not sure what you are asking. Does what I say below help?
> > For B, consider: we can make small changes to ones mind, adding a memory
> here, forgetting a memory there, so that, over time we could
>
> Externally adding/deleting memories I'd say would constitute a break in
> continuity.
>
Strictly speaking yes. But what about over the course of normal life? How
much is gained and lost between a person when they are five years old and
when they are fifty-five? Is it more accurate to say it's 100% the same
person, or is it better to say it's something like 5-10% the same person?
And is there a continuous spectrum between any two persons?
> > Then there are all the problems for which these give no good answer:
> >
> > For A:
> >
> > Why are two identical twins not the same person, when each is a
> continuity of the same fertilized egg (same body)?
>
> They don't have the same A and B. Different A:s and different B:s. Just
> the fact that they occupy different space and later on, will experience
> different angles, etc. makes A and B diverge.
>
I agree they diverge, but both twins are part of the same continuation of
what began as one shared body. If you trace back either twin over time, you
end up at what was a single shared cell (or shared cluster of cells). From
a pure bodily-continuity perspective, if we ask: "what experiences will
this body eventually have?" I think this perspective would have to say the
experiences of both twins belong to the future continuations of this cell.
This is strange, and something we rarely consider, but it all comes down
to: why am I experiencing this perspective, rather than some other? What
pre-conditions were necessary for me to have been born, be alive, and
experience life?
Did it depend on certain atoms?--(what if my mom ate a different lunch when
she was pregnant?) Does it depend on certain genes?--(what if my eyes had
been a different color?)
The twins, in this example share (or did share), the same material body,
and the same genes. Whatever was important to experience life as one twin
was president, identically, in the other. So what determined which
perspective one would have? If the first twin asked, why am I the first
twin born rather than the second? How would you answer? And does your
answer apply equally to anyone who asks, why was I born as this person
rather than a brother? Or why was I born to these parents, rather than some
other parents?
When you begin tugging on these questions, the conventional view begins to
unravel, especially when you consider the vast improbability of your
existence, if it required certain material or certain genes. Let's say it
required a specific sperm cell for you to be born. Then we're 1 in 200
million. But this so required a specific sperm and egg for your father to
be born, so 1 in (200 million)^2, then grandfather, 1 in (200 million)^3.
For any of us to have been born, is equivalent to winning a national
lottery for every one of our ancestors. This is the improbability of the
requirement of certain genes or certain materials being necessary to your
existence. When we abandon such pre-conditions, the result is
universalism/open individualism.
> > Why would receiving a neural prosthesis not be regarded in the same way
> as death?
>
> Depends on the circumstances. How is it implemented and when is it
> implemented?
>
Right now we only have things like artificial hippocampi and retinas, but
we can envision a future with entire brains are replaced after a memory
transfer to a new substrate (biological or otherwise). Let's assume a
complete brain replacement to a newly grown brain and memory copy, so
mentality is preserved but bodily continuity is discontinuously changed.
> > For B:
> >
> > Why are two duplicates created by a faulty teleporter not the same
> person, when each is a continuity of the same mind?
>
> They don't occupy the same space, and just by the fact of not doing
> that, their minds diverge.
>
Yes but we could imagine an upload of a mind to two identical virtual
realities. Would it then matter that the two realities were executed by
different CPUs? We know space and time are symmetrical, laws don't change
based on location or orientation in spacetime. So while is a physical
(bodily) distinction, from the internal subjective point of view it's the
same conscious state, indistinguishable from their point of view, and hence
is the same mental/psychological state.
> This is the theme of a very entertaining
> science fiction short story by Lars Gustafsson
> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lars_Gustafsson).
>
> In 1989, Gustafsson ventured into the field of science fiction and
> published Det sällsamma djuret från norr och andra
> science-fiction-berättelser. The book takes place 40,000 years into the
> future, when humans are extinct and the galaxy is populated by artificial
> intelligences. It is a philosophical exploration of life and existence and
> can be seen as an homage to Stanislav Lem.
>
Sounds very interesting!
> I don't think it is available in english, but I'd love to translate it
> if I ever got the chance and permission.
>
If you can, or if you find an English translation, please let me know.
> > Why is total amnesia not regarded in the same way as death?
>
> This is more of an ethical question to me and one frequently debated in
> hospitals the world over.
>
It's also interesting to consider, we all start from an initial
mindless/memoryless state. There is then some primordial state of
consciousness from which we all emerge. And further, during a degradation
of a dying mind, we return to this simplest possible conscious state. For
example, let's say the simplest mind state is when I'm the embryo the first
neurons wire together and fire for the first time, and in a dying brain
when the last two surviving neurons fire for the last time. Then from the
mental continuity perspective all mine states of all organisms are part of
a connected set.
> > For both A and B:
> >
> > If two people are each slowly morphed into the other person, where are
> the two people after the procedure? Have they teleported to
> > the other's location, or has each changed, but remained in the same
> spot? Why?
>
> If it is cell-by-cell replacement, I see no disturbance in A and B.
>
> > When a brain is split by cutting the corpus callosum, the result is two
> independently consciousness minds. Are they the same as the
> > mind that was there before? If not, where did the two minds come from?
> If the connection were to be restored to fuse the minds, what
> > happens to the two minds when they become one?
>
> Do they have A and B continuity? If you cut the hardware, to me, it
> sounds like you don't have A continuity and based on your description
> (is this a real experiment? Could you please in that case, send me some
> links.) doesn't sound as if you have B continuity either.
>
There is the Wada test, where an anesthetic is applied to one carotid
artery to anesthetize one brain hemisphere at a time. Consciousness is
preserved through the procedure regardless of which hemisphere is
anesthetized. When it wears off both hemispheres reintegrate into one
combined mind.
There are also many cases of split brains where each hemisphere remains
independently consciousness with its own beliefs, thoughts, desires, and
perceptions. When I return to my computer I can send you more references to
both these cases if you are interested. I find the self reports of those
undergoing this procedure to be fascinating.
There's also the case of the Hogan twins who are able to hear each other's
thoughts and see out of each other's eyes which raises interesting
questions of the dividing line between two minds.
> If you can fuse it together, who knows?
>
> > If the same person can exist in the same place at the two different
> times, then why can't the same person exist at two different
> > places at the same time?
>
> Laws of physics? This one, I don't understand, but it is getting late
> here, so I'll blame my tired brain. ;)
>
Physics reveals a complete symmetry and interchangeability between spaces
and time. But we seem to have a bias against the latter situation. If we
take time-space symmetry seriously, we must recognize this as a bias
internal to us. It suggests that duplicates are self, as much as the same
self is preserved over time.
> > When it comes to #1, it does sound philosophically unfeasible to
> me, since we're two selves havinga discussion. If all is
> > illusion, how can there even be any knowledge at all?
> >
> > There would still be individual conscious states, each with they're own
> consciousness, but nothing (actually) connecting one to any
> > other. It's consistent in my view, but unworkable as it provides no
> justification to doing anything since we would each be trapped in
> > our own thought moment forever.
>
> Well, let's leave #1 to the side. I think we're in agreement, perhaps
> for different, but maybe not incompatible reasons, that this is
> unworkable.
>
Okay, agreed.
> > When it comes to #3, I tried to google it, but it looks as if it
> is not a very popular stance among philosophers. Why do
> > you think it is not popular?
> >
> > It's relatively new, and highly counter to the brain's self-imposed
> ego-illuision, which is hard to escape without serious
> > meditation, drugs, traumatic brain injury, or logic.
>
> I find #3 very interesting. I'm not discounting it, and I will read
> through your blog again.
>
Thanks. Note that this article just introduces the idea, but doesn't really
argue for it. I would recommend Zuboff's linked paper to see the reasons
for believing it.
Jason
> Best regards,
> Daniel
>
>
> > Jason
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Sun, 27 Aug 2023, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
> >
> > The question you are asking about below concerns the topic
> in philosophy known as personal identity. That
> > topic asks: which I
> > experiences belong to which person's, in other words, how do
> we define the temporal borders of a person.
> > There are in general three
> > approaches generally taken:
> > 1. No-self/Anatta/empty individualism: each observer-moment,
> or thought-moment is its own isolated thing,
> > there's no such thing as a
> > self which has multiple distinct thought-moments.
> >
> > 2. Continuity theories/closed individualism: either bodily
> or psychological continuity. A self is a
> > continual things either though
> > the continuation of some physical body, or some more
> abstractly defined psychological organization.
> >
> > 3. Universalism/open Individualism: There are no bodily or
> psychological preconditions for an experience
> > being yours, all experiences
> > are I, and in truth there is only one mind.
> >
> > I think #2 leads to contradictions. #1 and #3 are logically
> consistent. Between #1 and #3, #3 is more useful
> > (it permits decision
> > theory) and further, there are strong probabilistic
> arguments for it. For example, those given in "One self:
> > the logic of experience"
> > which I cite here:
> >
> >
> https://alwaysasking.com/is-there-life-after-death/#10_Open_Individualism_and_the_Afterlife
> >
> > One consequence of Open Individualism is that it dissolves
> any concern of whether some particular copy is
> > you, as all conscious
> > perspectives are you.
> >
> > Jason
> >
> >
> > On Saturday, August 26, 2023, efc--- via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> > My position is that a separate uploaded copy of me is
> not me, thus would not grant the physical me
> > immortality. I would
> > look at it as a mind-seed, or something slightly
> similar to a part of me that lives on, just as a part
> > of me lives on in
> > a child, although actually that part is way more of
> me, than in a child.
> >
> > However, when talking about continuity and uploading,
> I think the ship of theseus uploading is much
> > more interesting from
> > an identity point of view.
> >
> > As some, or all of you already know, imagine that I'm
> uploaded neruon by neuron, over time. I would not
> > have a break, and
> > my mind would transition onto the new media.
> >
> > I would like to know what the people here who do not
> believe uploading grants a form of immortality
> > think about that
> > scenario? Would it fit in with your idea of identity
> and would you see yourselves being "immortal"
> > through a shop of
> > theseus procedure if it were possible?
> >
> > As for the copy approach, a starting point for me
> would be that my identity is probably based on my
> > mind, sense of
> > continuity and location. In a copy, continuity and
> location would go 2x, and thus not work with the
> > definition of
> > identity. In a theseus there would be no 2x, both
> continuity would be perserved, and location would be
> > single.
> >
> > Best regards,
> > Daniel
> >
> >
> > On Sat, 26 Aug 2023, Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat wrote:
> >
> > On 25/08/2023 20:11, Darin Sunley wrote:
> >
> > An important component of what a lot of
> people want out of immortality is not so much
> > continuity
> > as it is not-experiencing-discontinuity
> [And no, they're not the same thing].
> >
> > If I'm dying of cancer, and you do a brain
> scan, the resulting upload will remember being
> > me, but
> > /I'm/ still gonna experience a painful
> death. And no, killing me painlessly, or even
> > instantaneously, during or in the
> immediate aftermath of the brain scan doesn't solve the
> > problem
> > either.
> >
> > If "me" is ever on two substrates
> simultaneously, you may have copied me, but you haven't
> > moved
> > me, and a copy, by definition, isn't the
> me I want to be immortal.
> >
> >
> > So this 'me' that you are talking about, must be
> something that, when copied, somehow changes
> > into 'not-me'.
> > I don't understand this. If it's an exact copy,
> how is it not exactly the same? How can there not
> > now be two
> > 'me's? Two identical beings, in every way,
> including their subjective experience, with no
> > discontinuity with
> > the original singular being?
> >
> > When I hit 'send' on this message, everyone on
> the list will get a copy, and I will keep a copy.
> > Which one is
> > the real message? If they were conscious, why
> would that make any difference?
> >
> > You say "you may have copied me, but you haven't
> moved me". But how do you move data? You make a
> > second copy
> > of it then delete the first copy. So destroying
> copy 1 when copy 2 is made would be 'moving me',
> > yet you say
> > it wouldn't. Can you clarify why? I can't see
> (short of a belief in an uncopyable supernatural
> > 'soul') how
> > this could be.
> >
> > This is a crucial point, for those of us
> interested in uploading, so I think we should really
> > understand it,
> > yet it makes no sense to me. Would you please
> explain further?
> >
> > Could you also please explain the comment about
> continuity and not-discontinuity not being the
> > same thing?
> >
> > Ben
> > _______________________________________________
> > extropy-chat mailing list
> > extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> >
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > extropy-chat mailing list
> > extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> >
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
> >
> >
> >
> >_______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.extropy.org/pipermail/extropy-chat/attachments/20230827/20c0fe3f/attachment-0001.htm>
More information about the extropy-chat
mailing list