[ExI] teachers
efc at swisscows.email
efc at swisscows.email
Mon Aug 28 21:39:02 UTC 2023
Hello Jason,
On Sun, 27 Aug 2023, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
> But what about A and B?
>
> I am not sure what you are asking. Does what I say below help?
Sorry for being unclear. I meant that identity includes both. Not just
hw and not just sw, buth both, combined. I'm not saying it solves all
problems, but it seems to me as if it does solve at least some
challenges.
> > For B, consider: we can make small changes to ones mind, adding a memory here, forgetting a memory there, so that, over
> time we could
>
> Externally adding/deleting memories I'd say would constitute a break in
> continuity.
>
> Strictly speaking yes. But what about over the course of normal life? How much is gained and lost between a person when they are five
> years old and when they are fifty-five? Is it more accurate to say it's 100% the same person, or is it better to say it's something
> like 5-10% the same person?
Well, over the course of a life time, and assuming no external
interference, I'd say that there is a continuity of both body and mind,
as per the laws governing the workings of body and mind.
When it comes to the question of if this is a 10% person or a 100%
person, that would depend on the context and purpose of the conversation
it is used in.
> And is there a continuous spectrum between any two persons?
If you're talking about one organism separated by time, according to the
above, I'd say yes. Separate persons, no. But I think I misunderstand you here.
> > Then there are all the problems for which these give no good answer:
> >
> > For A:
> >
> > Why are two identical twins not the same person, when each is a continuity of the same fertilized egg (same body)?
>
> They don't have the same A and B. Different A:s and different B:s. Just
> the fact that they occupy different space and later on, will experience
> different angles, etc. makes A and B diverge.
>
> I agree they diverge, but both twins are part of the same continuation of what began as one shared body. If you trace back either
> twin over time, you end up at what was a single shared cell (or shared cluster of cells). From a pure bodily-continuity perspective,
Ah, but this was my badly made point above, that only bodily-continuity
is not enough. In a cell there is no mind, so the question then is not
relevant.
> if we ask: "what experiences will this body eventually have?" I think this perspective would have to say the experiences of both
> twins belong to the future continuations of this cell.
Same here. Cell is not enough. The continuity I'd say has to cover both
the body and the mind.
> This is strange, and something we rarely consider, but it all comes down to: why am I experiencing this perspective, rather than some
> other? What pre-conditions were necessary for me to have been born, be alive, and experience life?
>
> Did it depend on certain atoms?--(what if my mom ate a different lunch when she was pregnant?) Does it depend on certain
> genes?--(what if my eyes had been a different color?)
I think here maybe we start to diverge into questions of existence,
possibly reasons for living, and possibly teleological ideas.
> For any of us to have been born, is equivalent to winning a national lottery for every one of our ancestors. This is the
> improbability of the requirement of certain genes or certain materials being necessary to your existence. When we abandon such
> pre-conditions, the result is universalism/open individualism.
But the fact is that you (and I) were. The probability of it is an after
construction and also why I am not a fan of philosophical arguments
suchas Pascals wager. I think statistics, especially applied in this
way, and across ethereal realms leaving our material world, tend to lead
us astray.
> > Why would receiving a neural prosthesis not be regarded in the same way as death?
>
> Depends on the circumstances. How is it implemented and when is it
> implemented?
>
> Right now we only have things like artificial hippocampi and retinas, but we can envision a future with entire brains are replaced
> after a memory transfer to a new substrate (biological or otherwise). Let's assume a complete brain replacement to a newly grown
> brain and memory copy, so mentality is preserved but bodily continuity is discontinuously changed.
I think we covered this in the original scenario. I'd argue that a copy,
then restored, is not the same person due to the mind factor not being
continuous. I do see a possibility for the same person in a ship of
theseus procedure, since body and mind continuity would not be violated,
but only transformed.
> > For B:
> >
> > Why are two duplicates created by a faulty teleporter not the same person, when each is a continuity of the same mind?
>
> They don't occupy the same space, and just by the fact of not doing
> that, their minds diverge.
>
> Yes but we could imagine an upload of a mind to two identical virtual realities. Would it then matter that the two realities were
> executed by different CPUs? We know space and time are symmetrical, laws don't change based on location or orientation in spacetime.
Yes and no. Depending on how the upload was done, from where to where,
and how the continuity of the mind was handled. If a ship of theseus
operation was performed, and then copied onto a different set of
hardware, that would be one continuous and one copy. If you have linked
clones, I could see preservation, but also waste if the two clones
always had to give the same answer. Although from a disaster recovery
point of view, that would be a fascinating concept!
> This is the theme of a very entertaining
> science fiction short story by Lars Gustafsson
> (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lars_Gustafsson).
>
> Sounds very interesting!
Very much so! That's what you get when a philosopher writes science
fiction! ;)
> I don't think it is available in english, but I'd love to translate it
> if I ever got the chance and permission.
>
> If you can, or if you find an English translation, please let me know.
Well, I guess I'd have to track down the relative who owns the
copyright. I do have the book in a box in my attic somewhere. It's not a
long book, only 150 pages or so and about 10 stories, so it would not
take a long time to translate it into english.
> > Why is total amnesia not regarded in the same way as death?
>
> This is more of an ethical question to me and one frequently debated in
> hospitals the world over.
>
> It's also interesting to consider, we all start from an initial mindless/memoryless state. There is then some primordial state of
> consciousness from which we all emerge. And further, during a degradation of a dying mind, we return to this simplest possible
> conscious state. For example, let's say the simplest mind state is when I'm the embryo the first neurons wire together and fire for
> the first time, and in a dying brain when the last two surviving neurons fire for the last time. Then from the mental continuity
> perspective all mine states of all organisms are part of a connected set.
I don't see how. It's separate organs, with separate reactions. I can
however see and fully acknowledge that from a process point of view, or
"tree of life" point of view, we are all related. But that's purely
biologically and not related to my mind and sense of identity.
> There are also many cases of split brains where each hemisphere remains independently consciousness with its own beliefs, thoughts,
> desires, and perceptions. When I return to my computer I can send you more references to both these cases if you are interested. I
> find the self reports of those undergoing this procedure to be fascinating.
Please do! No need for me to armchair philosophize, when I can read a
paper about some fascinating biological procedure!
> Laws of physics? This one, I don't understand, but it is getting late
> here, so I'll blame my tired brain. ;)
>
> Physics reveals a complete symmetry and interchangeability between spaces and time. But we seem to have a bias against the latter
> situation. If we take time-space symmetry seriously, we must recognize this as a bias internal to us. It suggests that duplicates are
> self, as much as the same self is preserved over time.
I think that is a very big step and conclusion to make. Could you divide
it up into smaller steps? Maybe then I'll see the point.
> Thanks. Note that this article just introduces the idea, but doesn't really argue for it. I would recommend Zuboff's linked paper to
> see the reasons for believing it.
Thank you, will keep that in mind, and have a look at the paper. =)
Best regards,
Daniel
>
> Jason
>
>
>
> Best regards,
> Daniel
>
>
> > Jason
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Sun, 27 Aug 2023, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
> >
> > The question you are asking about below concerns the topic in philosophy known as personal identity. That
> > topic asks: which I
> > experiences belong to which person's, in other words, how do we define the temporal borders of a person.
> > There are in general three
> > approaches generally taken:
> > 1. No-self/Anatta/empty individualism: each observer-moment, or thought-moment is its own isolated thing,
> > there's no such thing as a
> > self which has multiple distinct thought-moments.
> >
> > 2. Continuity theories/closed individualism: either bodily or psychological continuity. A self is a
> > continual things either though
> > the continuation of some physical body, or some more abstractly defined psychological organization.
> >
> > 3. Universalism/open Individualism: There are no bodily or psychological preconditions for an experience
> > being yours, all experiences
> > are I, and in truth there is only one mind.
> >
> > I think #2 leads to contradictions. #1 and #3 are logically consistent. Between #1 and #3, #3 is more
> useful
> > (it permits decision
> > theory) and further, there are strong probabilistic arguments for it. For example, those given in "One
> self:
> > the logic of experience"
> > which I cite here:
> >
> > https://alwaysasking.com/is-there-life-after-death/#10_Open_Individualism_and_the_Afterlife
> >
> > One consequence of Open Individualism is that it dissolves any concern of whether some particular copy is
> > you, as all conscious
> > perspectives are you.
> >
> > Jason
> >
> >
> > On Saturday, August 26, 2023, efc--- via extropy-chat <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> > My position is that a separate uploaded copy of me is not me, thus would not grant the physical me
> > immortality. I would
> > look at it as a mind-seed, or something slightly similar to a part of me that lives on, just as a
> part
> > of me lives on in
> > a child, although actually that part is way more of me, than in a child.
> >
> > However, when talking about continuity and uploading, I think the ship of theseus uploading is much
> > more interesting from
> > an identity point of view.
> >
> > As some, or all of you already know, imagine that I'm uploaded neruon by neuron, over time. I would
> not
> > have a break, and
> > my mind would transition onto the new media.
> >
> > I would like to know what the people here who do not believe uploading grants a form of immortality
> > think about that
> > scenario? Would it fit in with your idea of identity and would you see yourselves being "immortal"
> > through a shop of
> > theseus procedure if it were possible?
> >
> > As for the copy approach, a starting point for me would be that my identity is probably based on my
> > mind, sense of
> > continuity and location. In a copy, continuity and location would go 2x, and thus not work with the
> > definition of
> > identity. In a theseus there would be no 2x, both continuity would be perserved, and location would
> be
> > single.
> >
> > Best regards,
> > Daniel
> >
> >
> > On Sat, 26 Aug 2023, Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat wrote:
> >
> > On 25/08/2023 20:11, Darin Sunley wrote:
> >
> > An important component of what a lot of people want out of immortality is not so much
> > continuity
> > as it is not-experiencing-discontinuity [And no, they're not the same thing].
> >
> > If I'm dying of cancer, and you do a brain scan, the resulting upload will remember being
> > me, but
> > /I'm/ still gonna experience a painful death. And no, killing me painlessly, or even
> > instantaneously, during or in the immediate aftermath of the brain scan doesn't solve the
> > problem
> > either.
> >
> > If "me" is ever on two substrates simultaneously, you may have copied me, but you haven't
> > moved
> > me, and a copy, by definition, isn't the me I want to be immortal.
> >
> >
> > So this 'me' that you are talking about, must be something that, when copied, somehow changes
> > into 'not-me'.
> > I don't understand this. If it's an exact copy, how is it not exactly the same? How can there
> not
> > now be two
> > 'me's? Two identical beings, in every way, including their subjective experience, with no
> > discontinuity with
> > the original singular being?
> >
> > When I hit 'send' on this message, everyone on the list will get a copy, and I will keep a
> copy.
> > Which one is
> > the real message? If they were conscious, why would that make any difference?
> >
> > You say "you may have copied me, but you haven't moved me". But how do you move data? You make
> a
> > second copy
> > of it then delete the first copy. So destroying copy 1 when copy 2 is made would be 'moving
> me',
> > yet you say
> > it wouldn't. Can you clarify why? I can't see (short of a belief in an uncopyable supernatural
> > 'soul') how
> > this could be.
> >
> > This is a crucial point, for those of us interested in uploading, so I think we should really
> > understand it,
> > yet it makes no sense to me. Would you please explain further?
> >
> > Could you also please explain the comment about continuity and not-discontinuity not being the
> > same thing?
> >
> > Ben
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