[ExI] teachers
Jason Resch
jasonresch at gmail.com
Mon Aug 28 23:46:02 UTC 2023
On Mon, Aug 28, 2023 at 4:40 PM efc--- via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> Hello Jason,
>
> On Sun, 27 Aug 2023, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
>
> > But what about A and B?
> >
> > I am not sure what you are asking. Does what I say below help?
>
> Sorry for being unclear. I meant that identity includes both. Not just
> hw and not just sw, buth both, combined. I'm not saying it solves all
> problems, but it seems to me as if it does solve at least some
> challenges.
>
Ahh I see what you mean now. One could define personal identity in terms of
the continuity of the same body and mind, but then the question is how
strict must the similarity be for the identity to hold?
If completely strict, you end up with the empty individualism of #1, if
unrestricted you end up with the open individualism of #3, since if one
permits gradual changes, it is still subject to gradually morphing into any
other person, and even with the restriction of bodily continuity, our
metabolism is constantly churning out old material and replacing it with
new material, (something like half the atoms in your brain are replaced
every 8 days through metabolism). What if these atoms were collected and
used to construct a new version of you, Ship of Theseus style? Which one
are you? How do we track bodily continuity when we are each, effectively
rivers through which atoms flow?
"So what is this mind of ours: what are these atoms with consciousness?
Last week’s potatoes! That is what now can remember what was going on in my
mind a year ago—a mind which has long ago been replaced. This is what it
means when one discovers how long it takes for the atoms of the brain to be
replaced by other atoms, to note that the thing which I call my
individuality is only a pattern or dance. The atoms come into my brain,
dance a dance, then go out; always new atoms but always doing the same
dance, remembering what the dance was yesterday."
-- Richard Feynman in “What do you care what other people think?” (1988)
>
> > > For B, consider: we can make small changes to ones mind, adding
> a memory here, forgetting a memory there, so that, over
> > time we could
> >
> > Externally adding/deleting memories I'd say would constitute a
> break in
> > continuity.
> >
> > Strictly speaking yes. But what about over the course of normal life?
> How much is gained and lost between a person when they are five
> > years old and when they are fifty-five? Is it more accurate to say it's
> 100% the same person, or is it better to say it's something
> > like 5-10% the same person?
>
> Well, over the course of a life time, and assuming no external
> interference, I'd say that there is a continuity of both body and mind,
> as per the laws governing the workings of body and mind.
>
> When it comes to the question of if this is a 10% person or a 100%
> person, that would depend on the context and purpose of the conversation
> it is used in.
>
> > And is there a continuous spectrum between any two persons?
>
> If you're talking about one organism separated by time, according to the
> above, I'd say yes. Separate persons, no. But I think I misunderstand you
> here.
>
I mean from the perspective of within an infinite reality, as described
here:
"You see, The Object contains the Continuum of Souls. It is a connected
set, with a frothy, fractal structure, of rather high dimensionality. The
Continuum contains an infinite number of Souls, all Souls in fact, and an
infinite number of them are You. Or at least, close enough to being You so
that nobody could tell the difference. Not even You.
And the Continuum also contains an infinite number of souls that are almost
You. And an infinite number that are sort of You. And because it is a
Continuum, and because there is really no objective way to tell which one
is really You, then any method one uses to try to distinguish between You
and non-You will produce nothing but illusion. In a sense, there is only
one You, and it is Everyone.
Of course, You can tell which one is you, can’t you? Or can you?"
-- Douglas Jones in "A Conversation <http://frombob.to/you/aconvers.html>"
(1996)
>
> > > Then there are all the problems for which these give no good
> answer:
> > >
> > > For A:
> > >
> > > Why are two identical twins not the same person, when each is a
> continuity of the same fertilized egg (same body)?
> >
> > They don't have the same A and B. Different A:s and different B:s.
> Just
> > the fact that they occupy different space and later on, will
> experience
> > different angles, etc. makes A and B diverge.
> >
> > I agree they diverge, but both twins are part of the same continuation
> of what began as one shared body. If you trace back either
> > twin over time, you end up at what was a single shared cell (or shared
> cluster of cells). From a pure bodily-continuity perspective,
>
> Ah, but this was my badly made point above, that only bodily-continuity
> is not enough. In a cell there is no mind, so the question then is not
> relevant.
>
> > if we ask: "what experiences will this body eventually have?" I think
> this perspective would have to say the experiences of both
> > twins belong to the future continuations of this cell.
>
> Same here. Cell is not enough. The continuity I'd say has to cover both
> the body and the mind.
>
Do concussions (or any discontinuous break in consciousness) end a person?
What about a coma, when someone is unconscious for many months and then
awakens with a (materially) completely new body? If continuity of body AND
mind are strictly required and must be continuous, then I see interruptions
in either as posing problems.
>
> > This is strange, and something we rarely consider, but it all comes down
> to: why am I experiencing this perspective, rather than some
> > other? What pre-conditions were necessary for me to have been born, be
> alive, and experience life?
> >
> > Did it depend on certain atoms?--(what if my mom ate a different lunch
> when she was pregnant?) Does it depend on certain
> > genes?--(what if my eyes had been a different color?)
>
> I think here maybe we start to diverge into questions of existence,
> possibly reasons for living, and possibly teleological ideas.
>
I don't mean to ask for what purpose or reason we are here, I mean rather:
what is the reason you are you, and I am me? What was necessary
(physically) for you to be the person you are peering through your eyes?
What physical changes might have interrupted or prevented that from
happening? What accounts for or explains the fact that you are Daniel
(rather than someone else, or no one)?
>
> > For any of us to have been born, is equivalent to winning a national
> lottery for every one of our ancestors. This is the
> > improbability of the requirement of certain genes or certain materials
> being necessary to your existence. When we abandon such
> > pre-conditions, the result is universalism/open individualism.
>
> But the fact is that you (and I) were. The probability of it is an after
> construction and also why I am not a fan of philosophical arguments
> suchas Pascals wager. I think statistics, especially applied in this
> way, and across ethereal realms leaving our material world, tend to lead
> us astray.
>
Not everyone buys the appropriateness of using probability arguments in
this way; but I consider it effectively the same thing as using fine-tuning
of the universe: it seems something improbable has happened: is there an
explanation? For the fine-tuning, the answer that demystifies the
improbability is the anthropic principle. For why you were born, when it
seems so unlikely, the answer that demystifies the improbability is open
individualism.
>
> > > Why would receiving a neural prosthesis not be regarded in the
> same way as death?
> >
> > Depends on the circumstances. How is it implemented and when is it
> > implemented?
> >
> > Right now we only have things like artificial hippocampi and retinas,
> but we can envision a future with entire brains are replaced
> > after a memory transfer to a new substrate (biological or otherwise).
> Let's assume a complete brain replacement to a newly grown
> > brain and memory copy, so mentality is preserved but bodily continuity
> is discontinuously changed.
>
> I think we covered this in the original scenario. I'd argue that a copy,
> then restored, is not the same person due to the mind factor not being
> continuous. I do see a possibility for the same person in a ship of
> theseus procedure, since body and mind continuity would not be violated,
> but only transformed.
>
What do you make the ship of Theseus where the old/original planks are
secretly gathered and used to reconstruct the ship in its original form?
What would you make of applying the same to a person's body, whose old
atoms are collected and reformed into an identical copy?
>
> > > For B:
> > >
> > > Why are two duplicates created by a faulty teleporter not the
> same person, when each is a continuity of the same mind?
> >
> > They don't occupy the same space, and just by the fact of not doing
> > that, their minds diverge.
> >
> > Yes but we could imagine an upload of a mind to two identical virtual
> realities. Would it then matter that the two realities were
> > executed by different CPUs? We know space and time are symmetrical, laws
> don't change based on location or orientation in spacetime.
>
> Yes and no. Depending on how the upload was done, from where to where,
> and how the continuity of the mind was handled. If a ship of theseus
> operation was performed, and then copied onto a different set of
> hardware, that would be one continuous and one copy. If you have linked
> clones, I could see preservation, but also waste if the two clones
> always had to give the same answer. Although from a disaster recovery
> point of view, that would be a fascinating concept!
>
Yes, this is actually a theme of the TV show Foundation. Backup clones are
kept, and new memories are constantly synchronized to their brains.
>
> > This is the theme of a very entertaining
> > science fiction short story by Lars Gustafsson
> > (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lars_Gustafsson).
> >
> > Sounds very interesting!
>
> Very much so! That's what you get when a philosopher writes science
> fiction! ;)
>
> > I don't think it is available in english, but I'd love to
> translate it
> > if I ever got the chance and permission.
> >
> > If you can, or if you find an English translation, please let me know.
>
> Well, I guess I'd have to track down the relative who owns the
> copyright. I do have the book in a box in my attic somewhere. It's not a
> long book, only 150 pages or so and about 10 stories, so it would not
> take a long time to translate it into english.
>
> > > Why is total amnesia not regarded in the same way as death?
> >
> > This is more of an ethical question to me and one frequently
> debated in
> > hospitals the world over.
> >
> > It's also interesting to consider, we all start from an initial
> mindless/memoryless state. There is then some primordial state of
> > consciousness from which we all emerge. And further, during a
> degradation of a dying mind, we return to this simplest possible
> > conscious state. For example, let's say the simplest mind state is when
> I'm the embryo the first neurons wire together and fire for
> > the first time, and in a dying brain when the last two surviving neurons
> fire for the last time. Then from the mental continuity
> > perspective all mine states of all organisms are part of a connected set.
>
> I don't see how. It's separate organs, with separate reactions. I can
> however see and fully acknowledge that from a process point of view, or
> "tree of life" point of view, we are all related. But that's purely
> biologically and not related to my mind and sense of identity.
>
Here I was operating from the assumption of mind continuity. This is what I
would say is the view (common among
physicalists/materialists/functionalists) where if you stepped into a
teleporter, you would survive on the other end when you were reconstructed,
even if new atoms were used. If we can survive teleporters, then it's the
mind-state that must be preserved for survival, not any particular
collection of atoms. In this case, if the last mind state of a dying brain
happens to be the same mind state of another brain which continues on, this
is in effect, identical to the transporter scenario. The mind survives
because its mind-state is instantiated elsewhere where it continues on,
despite that different material is used.
This does not work if you require bodily continuity as well, as every night
when we sleep, atoms are discontinuously replaced between successive
moments of consciousness (between when we fall asleep at night and awaken
in the morning, our bodies have changed, food has metabolized and become
part of our bodies, carbon from our bodies has been exhaled as CO2, etc.).
>
> > There are also many cases of split brains where each hemisphere remains
> independently consciousness with its own beliefs, thoughts,
> > desires, and perceptions. When I return to my computer I can send you
> more references to both these cases if you are interested. I
> > find the self reports of those undergoing this procedure to be
> fascinating.
>
> Please do! No need for me to armchair philosophize, when I can read a
> paper about some fascinating biological procedure!
>
*Hodan Twins:*
https://www.cbc.ca/cbcdocspov/features/the-hogan-twins-share-a-brain-and-see-out-of-each-others-eyes
Two conjoined twins were born with separate brains connected by a "thalamic
bridge" which enables them to see out of each other's eyes as well as hear
each other's thoughts.
*Wada Test:*
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wada_test
Video of procedure: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SBKc_ncPzOo
Comments from people who underwent it:
https://jcblackmon.com/2018/02/02/the-wada-test-for-philosophers-what-is-it-like-to-be-a-proper-part-of-your-own-brain-losing-and-regaining-other-proper-parts-of-your-brain/
"During the procedure they had me hold my arm straight up. For the right
side of the brain I didn't notice anything different. For the left side -
wow! When he showed me an object I looked at it and had that feeling you
get when you can't think of a word, like it's on the tip of your tongue.
Only that was true for all words - it was amazing! I had no words."
"The Amytal put my left hemisphere to sleep and I was shown 11 cards and
asked to read what I saw and remember it. I laughed continuously when I
knew what I was looking at, yet couldn’t pronounce the word, sentence or
picture I was looking at. I still laugh about it."
*Split brains:*
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Split-brain
Operation: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corpus_callosotomy
Patient: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZMLzP1VCANo
Reports: Paul was unusual in that he possessed verbal capacities in both
his right and left
hemispheres. This enabled each of his minds to be interviewed concerning
their thoughts, beliefs,
and desires. When asked his name, both hemispheres answered "Paul." When
asked his location,
both answered "Vermont." But when asked what he wanted to be, his right
hemisphere answered
"Automobile racer" while his left answered "Draftsman." These experiments
took place during the
Watergate scandal, and so Paul's opinion of President Nixon was queried.
His right hemisphere
expressed "dislike" while his left hemisphere expressed "like." One wonders
how Paul would have
voted. It might depend on which hand he used to pull the lever.
In addition to preferences, hemispheres can differ even on fundamental
beliefs. The
neuroscientist Vilayanur Ramachandran recounted the case of a patient with
a right hemisphere that
believed in God and a left hemisphere that did not. Sometimes these
conflicts manifest physically.
In a condition known as alien hand syndrome, split-brain patients may find
one hemisphere, and the
limbs it controls, behaving independently from and contrary to the will of
the other. One patient
struggled to get dressed in the morning. While his left hemisphere (and
right hand) tried to pull his
pants up, his left hand would pull them down. On a separate occasion, this
same patient became
angry at his wife. His left hand attacked her while his right hand tried to
protect her!
Roger Sperry, who received a Nobel prize for his work on split-brains,
remarked "Although
some authorities have been reluctant to credit the disconnected minor
hemisphere even with being
conscious, it is our own interpretation, based on a large number and
variety of non-verbal tests, that
the minor hemisphere is indeed a conscious system in its own right,
perceiving, thinking,
remembering, reasoning, willing, and emoting, all at a characteristically
human level, and that both
the left and the right hemisphere may be conscious simultaneously in
different, even in mutually
conflicting, mental experiences that run along in parallel."
>
> > Laws of physics? This one, I don't understand, but it is getting
> late
> > here, so I'll blame my tired brain. ;)
> >
> > Physics reveals a complete symmetry and interchangeability between
> spaces and time. But we seem to have a bias against the latter
> > situation. If we take time-space symmetry seriously, we must recognize
> this as a bias internal to us. It suggests that duplicates are
> > self, as much as the same self is preserved over time.
>
> I think that is a very big step and conclusion to make. Could you divide
> it up into smaller steps? Maybe then I'll see the point.
>
I've attached and excerpt from something I wrote that goes into this in
more detail, in particular see the story about the "Duplicators vs.
Restorers"
(Also, I have included also the story of the deep space travelers, which
also introduces some of the issues with personal identity, particularly as
it it pertains to duplication. It's not relevant to the interchangeability
of space and time, but you might still find it interesting.)
I also found these archived pages of an old member of this list, Lee
Corbin, who wrote several articles on personal identiy, which are an
interesting read, and relate to this topic:
- "Why Duplicates Are Self: A Proof
<https://web.archive.org/web/20081122035412/http://www.leecorbin.com/dupproof.html>
"
- "The Pit and the Duplicate
<https://web.archive.org/web/20081122035540/http://www.leecorbin.com/PitAndDuplicate.html>
"
- "Continuity of Identity: The Last Refuge of the Soul
<https://web.archive.org/web/20081122034745/http://www.leecorbin.com/LastRefuge.html>
"
>
> > Thanks. Note that this article just introduces the idea, but doesn't
> really argue for it. I would recommend Zuboff's linked paper to
> > see the reasons for believing it.
>
> Thank you, will keep that in mind, and have a look at the paper. =)
>
Thank you as well, for your always great questions and for making me have
to think. :-)
Jason
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Sun, 27 Aug 2023, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
> > >
> > > The question you are asking about below concerns the
> topic in philosophy known as personal identity. That
> > > topic asks: which I
> > > experiences belong to which person's, in other
> words, how do we define the temporal borders of a person.
> > > There are in general three
> > > approaches generally taken:
> > > 1. No-self/Anatta/empty individualism: each
> observer-moment, or thought-moment is its own isolated thing,
> > > there's no such thing as a
> > > self which has multiple distinct thought-moments.
> > >
> > > 2. Continuity theories/closed individualism: either
> bodily or psychological continuity. A self is a
> > > continual things either though
> > > the continuation of some physical body, or some more
> abstractly defined psychological organization.
> > >
> > > 3. Universalism/open Individualism: There are no
> bodily or psychological preconditions for an experience
> > > being yours, all experiences
> > > are I, and in truth there is only one mind.
> > >
> > > I think #2 leads to contradictions. #1 and #3 are
> logically consistent. Between #1 and #3, #3 is more
> > useful
> > > (it permits decision
> > > theory) and further, there are strong probabilistic
> arguments for it. For example, those given in "One
> > self:
> > > the logic of experience"
> > > which I cite here:
> > >
> > >
> https://alwaysasking.com/is-there-life-after-death/#10_Open_Individualism_and_the_Afterlife
> > >
> > > One consequence of Open Individualism is that it
> dissolves any concern of whether some particular copy is
> > > you, as all conscious
> > > perspectives are you.
> > >
> > > Jason
> > >
> > >
> > > On Saturday, August 26, 2023, efc--- via
> extropy-chat <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
> > > My position is that a separate uploaded copy
> of me is not me, thus would not grant the physical me
> > > immortality. I would
> > > look at it as a mind-seed, or something
> slightly similar to a part of me that lives on, just as a
> > part
> > > of me lives on in
> > > a child, although actually that part is way
> more of me, than in a child.
> > >
> > > However, when talking about continuity and
> uploading, I think the ship of theseus uploading is much
> > > more interesting from
> > > an identity point of view.
> > >
> > > As some, or all of you already know, imagine
> that I'm uploaded neruon by neuron, over time. I would
> > not
> > > have a break, and
> > > my mind would transition onto the new media.
> > >
> > > I would like to know what the people here who
> do not believe uploading grants a form of immortality
> > > think about that
> > > scenario? Would it fit in with your idea of
> identity and would you see yourselves being "immortal"
> > > through a shop of
> > > theseus procedure if it were possible?
> > >
> > > As for the copy approach, a starting point for
> me would be that my identity is probably based on my
> > > mind, sense of
> > > continuity and location. In a copy, continuity
> and location would go 2x, and thus not work with the
> > > definition of
> > > identity. In a theseus there would be no 2x,
> both continuity would be perserved, and location would
> > be
> > > single.
> > >
> > > Best regards,
> > > Daniel
> > >
> > >
> > > On Sat, 26 Aug 2023, Ben Zaiboc via
> extropy-chat wrote:
> > >
> > > On 25/08/2023 20:11, Darin Sunley wrote:
> > >
> > > An important component of what a
> lot of people want out of immortality is not so much
> > > continuity
> > > as it is
> not-experiencing-discontinuity [And no, they're not the same thing].
> > >
> > > If I'm dying of cancer, and you do
> a brain scan, the resulting upload will remember being
> > > me, but
> > > /I'm/ still gonna experience a
> painful death. And no, killing me painlessly, or even
> > > instantaneously, during or in the
> immediate aftermath of the brain scan doesn't solve the
> > > problem
> > > either.
> > >
> > > If "me" is ever on two substrates
> simultaneously, you may have copied me, but you haven't
> > > moved
> > > me, and a copy, by definition,
> isn't the me I want to be immortal.
> > >
> > >
> > > So this 'me' that you are talking about,
> must be something that, when copied, somehow changes
> > > into 'not-me'.
> > > I don't understand this. If it's an
> exact copy, how is it not exactly the same? How can there
> > not
> > > now be two
> > > 'me's? Two identical beings, in every
> way, including their subjective experience, with no
> > > discontinuity with
> > > the original singular being?
> > >
> > > When I hit 'send' on this message,
> everyone on the list will get a copy, and I will keep a
> > copy.
> > > Which one is
> > > the real message? If they were
> conscious, why would that make any difference?
> > >
> > > You say "you may have copied me, but you
> haven't moved me". But how do you move data? You make
> > a
> > > second copy
> > > of it then delete the first copy. So
> destroying copy 1 when copy 2 is made would be 'moving
> > me',
> > > yet you say
> > > it wouldn't. Can you clarify why? I
> can't see (short of a belief in an uncopyable supernatural
> > > 'soul') how
> > > this could be.
> > >
> > > This is a crucial point, for those of us
> interested in uploading, so I think we should really
> > > understand it,
> > > yet it makes no sense to me. Would you
> please explain further?
> > >
> > > Could you also please explain the
> comment about continuity and not-discontinuity not being the
> > > same thing?
> > >
> > > Ben
> > >
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