[extropy-chat] Qualia Bet

[Marc Geddes]

The comparison between 'Qualia' and 'Numbers' is well made.  Because the
same general kinds of philosophical arguments that are made about phenomenal
entities also apply to mathematical entities.



If I could just ask Robin (Hanson):  Where does the number '4' exist?  Is
the proof of 'Fermat's Last Theorem' real or a fiction?  If the proof is
real, is it part of the causal processes taking place in the brain?  What
about other mathematical entities?  Are they real or fiction?  How do they
fit into physical causal networks?



I think you (Robin) can see that the 'Qualia' question is not as clear cut
as you are making out.  Again, if you are prepared to believe in the
objective existence of mathematical entities, and if you agree that the
relationship between mathematical entities and causal brain-networks is not
a direct one, then why could the same not be true for Qualia?



Of course it's trivially true that all metaphysical entities have to be
related to causal processes *in some sense* (in order to produce observable
effects).  But this by itself establishes little.  It doesn't follow that
all metaphysical entities are fully reducible to descriptions in terms of
*physical* causality at all - where I am here defining physical causality
as: 'cause and effect relations between objects with spatial extensions and
the forces and motions associated with these objects'.



To try to explain away Qualia by demanding that everything be fully
describable in terms of physical causality is simply to presuppose the very
thing you are trying to prove (circular reasoning).  A believer in Qualia
could easily rebut simply by redefining the definition of 'causality' and
demanding that everything be explained, not in terms of physical causality,
but in terms of direct experience.



Now it *may* well prove to be the case that talk of Qualia can be eliminated
and replaced entirely by explanations in terms of physical causality
(eliminative materialism).  But it may not.  The facts of the matter can
only be determined through a combination of theory and observation, just
like everything else in science.





Suppose for instance that there's some kind of fundamental law of cognitive
science and information theory such that no explanation phrased entirely in
terms of physical causality can fully predict sentient behavior?  For
instance suppose that for some *in principle* theoretical reason
computational intractability prevents accurate real-time predictions of
sentient behavior if these predictions are phrased solely in terms of
physical processes?  Suppose that in order to achieve an accurate model of
sentient behavior one needs to introduce mental concepts into one's
explanations right from the start - i.e. suppose this is an *in principle*
requirement?  Then one would have to conclude that some mental concepts are
just as 'real' and fundamental as physical ones. So you see, the
philosophical arguments advanced in this thread that Qualia have to be a
part of the 'causal networks of the brain' don't prove a thing about Qualia
one way or the other.  On the contrary, the argument is weak, as gts and I
have shown by pointing out examples of abstract entities (mathematical
concepts) that many (Platonists) take to be objectivity real, yet clearly
don't directly fit into the causal networks of the brain at all.



The philosophical position known as 'Eliminative materialism'(the idea that
'qualia' don't exist but are simply misrepresentations of what are really
entirely material processes – which seems to be the position Eliezer and
Robin are arguing for) is based on arguments by philosophers Paul and
Patricia Churchland and Daniel Dennett (in fact the position traces back to
earlier arguments by philosophers Paul Feyerabend an d Quine), to the
effect: that (a) qualia are simply abstract (or theoretical entities) and
(b) should be replaced by the objective scientific viewpoint.  But the
argument undermines itself.  *Of course* I believe that 'Qualia' are
'theoretical abstractions' and *of course* I agree that the correct
view-point requires an objective scientific account, but the conclusion that
Qualia are fictions doesn't follow from (a) and (b) at all!  It's a total
non-sequitur.  In fact the very arguments applied by Eliminative materialism
to argue *against* Qualia can be used to argue for them!



Let look at the first argument of the Qualia skeptics: (a) 'Qualia' are
abstractions.  I say, of course they are!  But this doesn't prove a thing
against Qualia.  On the contrary, we could take a Platonic view of these
abstractions just as some philosophers do for mathematics.  In fact what I
was suggesting was not just that Qualia are *similar* to mathematical
entities, but that Qualia are in fact *identical* to mathematical entities.
That is to say, I think mathematical entities are just Qualia from a
different perspective.



I think the reason we're all so confused about Qualia is due to a limitation
of the human brain - as others have pointed out - we can't *see* qualia from
an objective perspective, only a subjective one.  This allows skeptics to
claim that they're fictional entities and all that exists are material
processes.  But as gts rightly pointed out, the fact we can only view Qualia
subjectively doesn't mean that Qualia are not objectively real.  Eliezer of
all people should have known better.  The argument against Qualia is based
solely on a limitation of the *human* brain and it is folly to suppose that
this limitation applies to minds in general.  The fact that *we* (humans)
can only ever view Qualia from a subjective perspective does not mean that
more advanced minds couldn't view them from an *objective* perspective. Now
the human brain does not appear to be capable of direct perception of
mathematical entities.  I think if the human brain *was* so capable, it
would be obvious to everyone that Qualia and mathematical entities are one
and the same i.e. we would be having second-order Qualia capable of
objectively viewing first-order Qualia.



If it's possible to objectivity view Qualia, the second argument of the
Qualia skeptics is also exposed as a total non-sequitur.  Recall that the
eliminative materialists argue that (b) The most accurate view-point of
something is the objective scientific view-point.  The believer in Qualia
can just say: well of course I agree with (b), but so what?  For *Qualia
themselves are a part of objective science* !  As I suggested earlier, if it
proves that accurate models of sentient behaviour are *in principle*
impossible without introducing mental concepts into one's explanations
(perhaps due to some theorem involving computational intractability), then
one would have to conclude that some mental concepts are just as fundamental
and real as physical concepts and the ontology of objective science would
have to be broadened to include these mental concepts.



So you see, both the arguments of Eliminative materialists are simply
without philosophical merit.



But if Qualia and mathematical entities are equivalent as I claim and if as
I said, the human brain is not capable of direct perception of mathematical
entities. Then how is it that we have qualia at all?  The answer, I think,
lies in the truth of mathematical Platonism.  The human brain cannot
directly generate perceptions of mathematical entities, but if mathematics
is *out there* in reality, then the actions of the brain will still
*indirectly* involve mathematical relations (since according to Platonism
math is the fabric of reality itself).  Hence even without explicit modeling
of mathematical entities, there can still be *indirect* Qualia associated
with the brain.  Clever eh?



Are you familiar with Bertrand Russell's theory of 'Dual-aspect monism' gts?
Well basically, my philosophical theory is vaguely like that, but extended
to a more complex 'Seven-fold-aspect monism'.  In the Dual-aspect monism of
Russell, the *Intrinsic* properties of reality were equated with mental
concepts, and the *Relational* properties of reality were equated with
physical concepts.  But in my theory, I have Seven different general
'aspects' instead of just the two of the original Russell theory.  My core
idea, as I've explained, is to equate Qualia wih mathematical entities.



Panpsychism is a secondary consequence of my theory.  Whilst critics of
Panpsychism are right to point out that Panpsychism *by itself* doesn't
explain anything, it is perfectly logically acceptable to have Panpsychism
emerging as a *secondary consequence* of one's metaphysics i.e. a theorem of
a deeper explanatory theory.



Sooner or later someone smarter than me will independently discover the
principles of my Mathematico-Cognition Reality Theory (MCRT) and develop
them in rigorous mathematical way.  When that happens, the arguments of the
Qualia skeptics will collapse, and with them the entire rotten edifice of
the current AGI paradigm will crumple  (including the ridiculous ideas that
you can have general intelligence without qualia, that reasoning is entirely
reducible to Bayes etc).


--
To see a World in a grain of sand,
And Heaven in a wild flower,
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand
And Eternity in an hour.
-William Blake

Please visit my web-site:
http://www.riemannai.org/
Sci-Fi, Science and Fantasy
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