[ExI] Uploading and selfhood

Jef Allbright jef at jefallbright.net
Fri Mar 28 17:01:22 UTC 2008


On Fri, Mar 28, 2008 at 8:40 AM, Michael Miller <ain_ani at yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> Apologies if this has already been covered, but I've been thinking for a
> little while about uploading and the attendent reduction of selfhood to
> brain processes. The following review (from New Scientist) makes some points
> which I think present the most compelling case against the viability of
> uploading. That is, that the self (and specifically, thoughts) are not
> something located in or identical with the brain - they are a facet of an
> entire entity, dependent just as much on the whole body and the social
> processes of which we are a part. Robert Pepperell puts it well in his book
> the Posthuman Condition when he says "Consciousness is the function of an
> organsm, not an organ".
>
>
> I wonder, how do the proponents of uploading argue against these ideas?

Your post appears to indiscriminately blur concepts of entity and
agency, consciousness and personal identity, but simply put, your
assertion is similar to saying that the Microsoft Word software alone
is not sufficient to represent the entity we know as Microsoft Word
except within the context of an appropriate operating system, hardware
environment..., and even to the extent of including the interactions
of the user/observer.

I would say yes, of course, and it's an important understanding, but
this in no way precludes instantiating that software within various
and even duplicate contexts while legitimately preserving perceived
identity.  However, on the same basis, two systems of any degree of
functional physical/similarity may be not only non-identical but in
active conflict with each other, again depending entirely on the
context.  An easy example is two physical/function copies of a person
emerge from a duplicator device, and find themselves immediately in
physical/functional conflict over control and enjoyment of property,
spouse, etc.

Personal identity is always only a function of perceived agency
**within an observer**, regardless of the physical, functional or
ontological status of the entity on whose behalf it acts, and even
when the observer is the agent itself.

- Jef



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