[ExI] fun outsider's view on ai
brent.allsop at canonizer.com
Sat May 14 21:24:13 UTC 2016
Thanks for asking. It all has to do with the theoretical possibility of
inverted qualia. For example, the qualitative nature of my "redness"
may be more like the qualitative nature of your "greenness". If it is,
or if it is not, how could you know? We all interpret "redness", based
on the consensus about the source of the perception process, rather than
the quality of our knowledge, or the result of our knowledge. This
failure to qualitatively interpret things correctly is the only thing
that is standing in the way from us knowing and detecting, at least on a
qualitatively elemental level, what other minds are like, and whether or
not they are conscious "like we are". Sure, you can simulate any
intelligent behavior with abstract representations, but unless you know
how to properly interpret what an abstract simulation is meant to
represent, you can't know what the thing being simulated is
For more information on "effing the ineffable" and how to interpret
things correctly, google for the 15 minute video of my talk on
On 5/14/2016 11:19 AM, William Flynn Wallace wrote:
> And the only way to know what the word "red" means, when you say it,
> is to know how to properly interpret, qualitatively, what you mean for
> it to represent?
> Brent Allsop
> Just how would we know, in the beginning of our learning of language,
> what anything means without reference to what other people tell us it
> means? A consensus. What people take as the meaning of a word IS the
> meaning of it, even as it may change over the years. As a
> psychologist, I say that if you look at the word 'red' and experience
> a visual object that is red, then yes, the word, in that instance,
> does have a red quality. If it conjures up communism, then no. (of
> course we are in philosophy where anyone can be right, or wrong, or
> bill w
> On Sat, May 14, 2016 at 6:50 AM, Brent Allsop
> <brent.allsop at canonizer.com <mailto:brent.allsop at canonizer.com>> wrote:
> Hi John,
> Thanks for expending the effort on this, I really want to try to
> better understand this line of thinking so I can better communicate.
> On 5/12/2016 1:08 PM, John Clark wrote:
>> On Thu, May 12, 2016 at 8:10 AM, Brent Allsop
>> <brent.allsop at canonizer.com>wrote:
>> I can agree with everything you are saying, even when you say
>> "we do know that a program with a million lines of code can
>> manufacture the qualia 'red'". I must admit that this is a
>> very testable scientific theory that could be proven correct
>> by demonstration.
>> It's already been tested and proved to be correct.
>> I know for a fact that my brain can manufacture the red qualia
>> and I know for a fact that a program with a
>> million lines of code
>> (and probably less) assembled my brain from generic atoms.
> We are talking about two different thing here. There is the
> manufacturing process, and then there is what is manufactured.
> DNA instructs something to be build that is responsible for or has
> an elemental redness quality. You are talking about the DNA
> manufacturing process, and I am talking about what is built from
> that. Would you agree that there are likely other ways of
> building what is responsible for an elemental redness and
> greenness qualities besides DNA manufacturing?
>> OK, so something less than a million lines of code can
>> "manufacture" the elemental qualia red.
>> That and interactions with the environment.
>> I assume you will agree that a different set of code can
>> "manufacture" the qualia green, and that eventually we will
>> be able to know, recognize, and detect each of these and
>> their differences in each of our minds.
>> Maybe but not necessarily, Godelian limits on self knowledge
>> might come into play.
> So you are saying that qualia will eternally be ineffable or not
> understandable / mapable / observable, even for simple qualia like
> elemental redness an greenness?
>> Then we will be able to see each of these in our brains, and
>> be able to tell things like if my code "manufacturing" red is
>> more like your code "manufacturing" green.
>> I might know that a certain pattern of neuron firings in my
>> brain produces the red qualia in me, but you're brain is
>> organized differently than mine otherwise you would be me, so
>> what sort of qualia your brain is producing I have no way of
>> knowing, I don't even know for certain that your brain is
>> producing any qualia at all. I might be the only conscious being
>> in the universe, I doubt it but I can't prove it's not true nor
>> will I ever be able to. That's why all this talk about qualia is
>> a dead end, if you want to make progress investigate intelligent
> Again, you are conflating two things together and thinking of them
> as if they were the same. You are talking about composite qualia
> and I am talking about elemental qualia. I am predicting that
> there is an elemental, fully understandable / mapable qualia
> level, especially for qualia like redness and greenness. And that
> we can detect, understand, a communicate the quality (detect if we
> have roughly inverted qualia or not) to each other at this level.
>> you are still being blind to the difference between an
>> abstract representation that represents what is
>> "manufactured" and the real quality being "manufactured".
>> I know for a fact that I am not blind and I know for a fact that
>> I can experience the
>> red qualia
> Obviously, but you are still completely missing what I am trying
> to say. Let me see if this helps. Would you agree that an
> abstract symbol like the word "red" does not have a redness
> quality? And the only way to know what the word "red" means, when
> you say it, is to know how to properly interpret, qualitatively,
> what you mean for it to represent?
> Brent Allsop
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