[ExI] Do digital computers feel?

[Stathis Papaioannou]

Brent Allsop wrote:

>I feel like we’re repeatedly saying many things back and forth, but filing
to communicate.  I’m talking about two types of speaking.  There is qualia
blind speaking, and there is speaking that is not qualia blind.  You seem
to be thinking that all the speaking I’m talking about is qualia blind
speaking, and not understanding what I mean by speaking that is not qualia
blind.  You are not understanding what might enable someone to be able to
make a statement like: “My knowledge of red is like your knowledge of
green” in a way that is demonstrably provable to everyone both objectively
and subjectively, by various effing of the ineffable techniques.  Once we
can use binding systems, and eff to each other what our conscious knowledge
is qualitatively like, in ways that are demonstrable to all, in both
subjective and objective ways...  Once we can do this, qualia inverts and
qualia zombies (those with abstracted knowledge that is devoid of any
qualia) will talk in very different ways when talking about what their
knowledge is qualitatively like.<


I would like to first to discuss speaking, the *observable behaviour* that
we see (mouth moving) and hear (sound waves issue forth from the mouth and
hit our ears). Then, we can discuss the qualia that are associated with
speaking. Is that OK?


Speaking, the *observable behaviour*, is due to a sequence of nerve
impulses sent to the muscles of the vocal cords, tongue and mouth, causing
these muscles to contract in certain patterns while air is expelled from
the lungs. Leading to these nerve impulses is a complex chain of neural
events in the brain. If the speech is about seeing strawberries, then this
chain of neural events will involve neurons in the visual cortex. Some of
the neurons in the visual cortex will interact with each other using
glutamate and glutamate receptors. Consider the glutamate receptors that,
when glutamate binds, open ion channels allowing potassium ions to pass,
leading to depolarisation of the cell membrane and propagation of an action
potential down the axon. Now, we make these changes: in the presynaptic
neuron replace the glutamate with glycine; in the postsynaptic neuron
replace the glutamate receptors with glycine receptors that open ion
channels when glycine binds in the same way as the original glutamate
receptors do when glutamate binds. By analogy, we have changed the key
(glutamate to glycine) and we have also changed the lock (glutamate
receptor to glycine receptor), so we can still get through the door
(potassium ion channels open). Is this clear so far?


Now, it should be clear that the *observable behaviour* of the brain with
the modified neurons should be the same as the original brain. This is
because the modified neurons will fire in the same sequence and for the
same duration as the original neurons, and consequently so will all the
neurons that receive input from them, and so will the muscles that control
speech. So the subject with the modified neurons will have the same
speaking *observable behaviour*. If the subject with the unmodified brain
says that he can see red strawberries, then after the brain modification he
will say that the strawberries still look red, exactly the same as before.
Do you agree about this *observable behaviour*?


Here is the point where we can move from discussion of *observable
behaviour* to discussion of qualia. Given the hypothesis that red qualia
are due to glutamate, how do you reconcile the fact that we have swapped
glutamate for glycine but the subject still says that everything looks red
like before? Do you think that he is mistaken about his qualia? How is this
possible?



>Another part of the communication problem is that you seem to not fully
understand the implication or function of the “binding system” and the
function it performs during neural substitution.  Also, you don’t seem to
understand the implication of being able to connect two brains with binding
systems, enabling two brains to eff the ineffable in the strongest
undeniable way.<


Whatever function any part of the brain performs before neural
substitution, it will perform the same function after neural substitution,
otherwise the substituted component is not functionally identical. In the
example above, if we just swap glutamate for glycine it won't work; if we
just swap glutamate receptors for glycine receptors it won't work; but if
we swap both then it will work.

>I talk about a simplistic binding system that is binding two elemental
qualitative representations together.  When you replace half the
representations of knowledge with something that is qualitatively
different, in order for the binding system to behave the same, you must map
the new qualitatively different representations back to the original, for
the binding system to behave the same.  And when you finally replace the
binding system, you must then invert all the representations of knowledge
being feed to it, before it can behave the same.  This simplistic system
behaves exactly as we both predict, during the neural substitution.  You
seem to miss the fact that when you scale this binding system up to include
all of our diverse qualitative knowledge, you must replace all of the
knowledge representations being fed to the binding system at the same time
you replace the entire binding system.  Again, so that the system will
behave exactly as you and I agree will happen, as the neural substitution
progresses.  I see no evidence that you fully understand the implications
of what I’m trying to describe with all this.<

You're missing the point when you talk about "qualitative representation".
*Observable behaviour* is the only thing necessary to consider in order to
replicate *observable behaviour*. The argument is that if you ignore qualia
and just replicate *observable behaviour* then the qualia will also
necessarily be replicated. I gave an example of this which I believe is
clear (tell me if not) with the glutamate/glycine swap.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou
-- 
Stathis Papaioannou
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