[ExI] Fwd: Mental Phenomena
brent.allsop at gmail.com
Sat Feb 15 18:58:38 UTC 2020
Yes, you take this as me contradicting what you and I are saying.
I describe your model, in a way that you agree is complete. Then I try to
point out the inconsistencies in that model, in hopes that you will realize
that maybe we should think about it in a different way. When you take what
I am saying, and map it into your model, it becomes “the replacement part
must be the same, then you say that the observable behavior would not
necessarily be the same” This is a complete misinterpretation of what I’m
trying to say. This is only twisting what I’m trying to say into your
model. If you could understand my model, you would see that I’m not saying
anything even remotely close to what you think I am saying.
Try a model where knowledge of reality is different than reality, a model
in which there are real colors, which we can be directly aware of. A model
in which these real colors are the objectively observable initial causes of
us saying: “That is red”. Try a model where it is the factual color that
is important, not what we are reporting it to be. If you do this, you will
discover that I am trying to say something very different than what you
think I am saying.
---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>
Date: Fri, Feb 14, 2020 at 10:45 PM
Subject: Re: [ExI] Mental Phenomena
To: Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com>
On Sat, 15 Feb 2020 at 09:42, Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com> wrote:
> Hi Stathis,
> On Fri, Feb 14, 2020 at 12:59 PM Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>
>> You have attempted to point out a problem, but you have not succeeded in
>> pointing out a problem.
> Yes. This is so frustrating. I believe I fully understand what you are
> saying, and the arguments you are using which you think justify your belief
> that it is a "LOGICAL NECESSITY" that redness can arise from ones and
> zeros. And I've proven this in that I've repeated it back to you all of
> it in a way that says you agree that I understand what you are saying.
> Yet you can do nothing even close to the same in return.
You repeat back what I say, but then you contradict yourself. That is, you
claim you understand what it means when I say that the observable behaviour
of the system with the replacement part must be the same, then you say that
the observable behaviour would not necessarily be the same because the
qualia might be different. You then suggest that an experiment could
demonstrate the truth of the matter. But that is like saying an experiment
might demonstrate that 2 + 2 = 5.
To me, It seems so obvious that there are multiple problems in what you are
> claiming. But no matter what words I try to use, to describe those
> problems, you still obviously just twist everything I say, to fit within
> your qualia blind model, and fail to understand anything about the model
> I'm trying to describe. You certainly can't describe anything about my
> model, and how it reveals the problems in your arguments.
> I guess my only solace is that I KNOW (It is a LOGICAL NECESSITY ;) That
> some day experimentalists will objectively observe something (as in some
> kind of substrate) in the brain, that is redness, and that nobody will ever
> be able to find anything other that THAT substrate (even if it is only some
> kind of function, the fact that redness results from that function must be
> considered a physical fact, and people will refer to that a s particular
> substrate on which conscious redness cannot exist without. My prediction
> is also, that this "functionalist" view is holding back scientific
> understanding of the brain, and future histories will agree on the damage
> that you, Chalmers and everyone who so instists that this is a "logical
> necessity" are slowing down progress. I feel it is my life work, to
> overcome this falcy, to show experimentalists how not to be qualia blind,
> so they can discover what it is that has a redness quality, we we can
> finally falsify all this "crap in the gap" (functionalism is the largest
> load of crap to me, even worse than substance dualism and quantum views on
> consciousness.) And it is so frustrating to me, when I'm trying to help
> the world to understand how to use experimental methods in qualia, on
> social media, in places like Quora. Only to have people like you and James
> Carroll and all the other "functionalists" (By far the most popular
> consensu camp, still) who everyone knows is way smarter than I could ever
> be come in and cut me off at the knees.
> I guess the reason I'm so emotional about this is it is far more than just
> wanting to be right, and wanting to not be wrong. It is a matter of
> wanting to push the science of consciousness forward. So people can better
> understand what it will mean, and what it will be like to be uploaded, and
> all that. Let me ask you this. Do you think your continued touting of
> this functionalism, and what Chalmers is doing, and all the rest of you
> functionalists, is moving the understanding of consciousness forwards or
> backwards? Is it helping anyone to understanding what uploading could be
> like? How do you think historians (after they discover what it is that has
> a redness quality) will judge promoters of functionalism? Will they
> consider "functionalists" as people that helped move the science forward,
> or as clueless people that lead everyone down obviously mistaken rat holes,
> preventing any progress in the field. Something that continues to keep
> everyone from understanding what it means to be qualia blind, or having a
> clue about what it might mean to be uploaded.
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