[ExI] Possible seat of consciousness found

Fri Feb 21 22:29:12 UTC 2020

Hi William,
I described Stathis model back to him.  Then he replied that I needed to
include: *As long as the 'behavior' remains the same the subjectivity must
also remain the same.*”
Then I explicitly pointed to where I said exactly that, in my description
which I had sent.  That is why I bolded it, so that he would notice that I
am reiterating it back to him, as he insists.

And as usual, just like John always does, you are stating facts me,
stathis, and everyone agree with, they are just completely unrelated to
what we are talking about.
You  said: "The taste of something fades as you eat more and more of it."
It is this kind of 'fading' or change, we are talking about, you are
talking about something that isn't changing, which is true, but completely
unrelated to the 'fading' conscious knowledge changes we are talking about.

On Fri, Feb 21, 2020 at 3:07 PM William Flynn Wallace via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> “*As long as the 'behavior' remains the same the subjectivity must also
> remain the same.*”
>
> This is false - clearly.  The taste of something fades as you eat more and
> more of it.  This is true of other senses as well. It's called habituation.
> The converse is also false - even if the taste remains the same (say you
> only had two) you can still quit eating.
>
> bill w
>
> On Fri, Feb 21, 2020 at 3:33 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, 22 Feb 2020 at 07:20, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi Stathis,
>>>
>>> OK, so we have
>>>     "Qualia = subjective experiences = an aspect of phenomenal
>>> consciousness".
>>>
>>> And we have
>>>     " Behaviour = that which an external observer can see"
>>>
>>> and we have
>>>     “*As long as the 'behavior' remains the same the subjectivity must
>>> also remain the same.*”
>>>
>>> which connects the two in a consistent and factual way.
>>>
>>> Would you also agree with the converse of the above statement?:
>>>     “*As long as the 'subjectivity' (quale) remains the same the
>>> behavior must also remain the same.*”
>>>
>>
>> Yes. If we consider a behaviour such as speech, the subject will not say
>> that their qualia have changed unless they think that they have changed.
>>
>> Or at least if there is a set of behavior for a particular 'subjectivity'
>>> redness, and a set of behavior for a different subjectivity 'greenness,'
>>> if the subjectivity is different the corresponding sets of behaviors for
>>> each of those different 'subjectivity' (quale), must be disjoint.  In other
>>> words any particular set of behavior can't have two different
>>> 'subjectivity' (quale).
>>>
>>
>> Yes, but there is a potential problem here. If we speculate that the
>> subject’s qualia have changed from redness to greenness, but their
>> behaviour does not change because they do not notice a change, then in what
>> sense is it meaningful to say that the qualia have changed?
>>
>> And, for you, these behaviors which are factually related to particular
>>> subjectivity (qualia) are independent of any particular set of physics
>>> (only because of the substitution argument).
>>>
>>> In other words, we have a dependent subjective layer like redness and
>>> greenness (and corresponding disjoint sets of behavior) out of which
>>> consciousness is constructed, that rides on top of any physical layer in a
>>> way that can be considered physical substrate independent.
>>>
>>> The terminology I think we should use is the former is consciousness is
>>> substrate dependent (where that substrate is subjectivity or quala) the
>>> behavior of which is independent of any particular set of physics.
>>>
>>> But I'm imagining you won't like even this kind of qualia being any kind
>>> of substrate, so I was trying to come up with another term qualia strate to
>>> make you happy.
>>>
>>
>> You’re right, I don’t think it is good to use the word “substrate”
>> referring to qualia because “substrate” specifically refers to a physical
>> substance. But I am confused as to why you would say consciousness is
>> dependent on qualia, since consciousness and qualia are essentially the
>> same thing. The only difference is that consciousness is usually used to
>> mean multiple qualia taken together.
>>
>> So, my question to you is: "Do we need a different terminology, or can we
>>> consider qualia (and the associated behaviors) as a substrate on which
>>> consciousness is dependent?"
>>>
>>> No matter what you call it, it is still the same thing, right?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, Feb 20, 2020 at 4:23 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, 20 Feb 2020 at 09:19, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Hi Stathis,
>>>>> So then does it help if I point out the fact that consciousness is red
>>>>> and green qualia strate dependent (as opposed to saying sub strate
>>>>> dependent)?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> No, because I won't know what "qualia strate dependent" means and how
>>>> it is different from "sub strate dependent". You could define them but you
>>>> would have to do so every time you use them.
>>>>
>>>> These are some terms that I find unambiguous:
>>>>
>>>> Qualia = subjective experiences = an aspect of phenomenal consciousness
>>>> Behaviour = that which an external observer can see
>>>> Qualia are substrate dependent = only a particular substance or
>>>> physical process can give rise to the particular qualia
>>>>
>>>> Are there more terms that are necessary for this discussion and need to
>>>> be defined?
>>>>
>>>> Using even some apparently simple terms such as "knowledge", for
>>>> example, can become confusing. "Knowledge" can have an objective as well as
>>>> a subjective element; "knowledge of qualia" is doubly confusing, because it
>>>> could mean directly experiencing qualia or it could mean observing
>>>> behaviour which might be associated with qualia.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Feb 18, 2020 at 3:51 PM Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tue, Feb 18, 2020 at 3:36 PM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
>>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I think you could simplify your language. “Red qualia” or “red
>>>>>>> experience” is understood by most people and is unambiguous. It is also
>>>>>>> understood that it is not the strawberry that has the red qualia, it is the
>>>>>>> observer. Talking about red, redness, redness quality, redness knowledge
>>>>>>> becomes confusing to keep track of. I would have to go back and check if
>>>>>>> you mean that “redness quality” is something in the strawberry or in my
>>>>>>> mind, and if “redness knowledge” is the same or different.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That makes a lot of sense.  Thanks for this information.
>>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> extropy-chat mailing list
>>>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>>>>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Stathis Papaioannou
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>>>>
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>>>
>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
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>>
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