[ExI] The quick and easy path to uploading

Stathis Papaioannou stathisp at gmail.com
Mon Dec 20 09:14:32 UTC 2021

On Mon, 20 Dec 2021 at 20:01, Ben Zaiboc via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> On 19/12/2021 13:48, Stathis wrote:
> On Sun, 19 Dec 2021 at 11:04, Darin Sunley via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>> To my mind, "uploading" implies a continuity of identity. I don't just
>> want to die while watching another separate mind that has my memories and
>> personality live forever in a computer. /I/ want to live forever in a
>> computer.
> It's the difference between making a copy and destroying the original, as
> per the Star Trek teleporter, or making a copy and preserving the original,
> as per the Star Trek teleporter when it malfunctions. In the former case,
> you will have continuity of identity with the copy, while in the latter,
> you have a 50% chance of having continuity with the copy or the original.
> There is no difference, assuming the 'copy' is of high-enough fidelity.
> There is continuity of identity in both cases, has to be, or the process
> hasn't worked.
> It's the old story of the dividing amoeba. Which of the two daughter
> amoebas is the original, and which the copy? Does the question even mean
> anything?
> Uploading doesn't just imply a continuity of identity, it necessarily
> involves it. Otherwise it isn't uploading. Whether there are one or a
> million copies of the 'original mind' doesn't matter (the whole terminology
> is confusing, in fact. Using the word 'copy' causes a lot of
> misunderstanding, I feel*). There is still continuity of identity. And if
> you just can't wrap your head around the concept of branching identity,
> well, welcome to the future.
But there is a problem because if there are multiple copies they are not
telepathically linked. Each copy feels itself to be the unique continuation
of the original, because that is how our psychology has evolved. This is
the case even if each copy knows, logically, that all the other copies have
equal claim to be the continuation of the original. Given that this is how
human minds work, expectations about the future when there are multiple
copies work probabilistically. It is also what happens if the Many Worlds
interpretation of QM is true.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou
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