[ExI] Zombies are logically inconsistent: a proof

Wed May 17 16:57:40 UTC 2023

On Wed, May 17, 2023 at 10:40 AM Gadersd via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> Yes I think they accept this. If it's logically possible for a physically
> identical being to behave in all manners in the same ways, and not be
> conscious, then there can be no test to determine if another is conscious.
>
> Moreover, there can be no test anyone could perform to know they're not
> themselves a zombie (this point is often overlooked by believers in zombies
> but it follows from their belief that qualia have no effects in the world).
>
>
> Isn’t “I think therefore I am” a sufficient observation to prove
> self-consciousness to oneself?
>

In the framework where zombies are possible, there are two parts to one's
self:
P1: The "physical self", which operates entirely within the physical world,
and whose every action, behavior, and act of speech is driven by physical
causes and physical effects.
P2: The "epiphenomenal qualia bundle", which is caused by the physical
world, but which has no effects whatsoever on the physical world. All the
qualia are in a "causally disconnected lock box" which exist in isolation
and have no bearing on anything physical.

Being the one one who experiences the epiphenomenal qualia, could be
considered a self-proof that one is conscious, or at least they could
identify themselves with the "P2" part of the self. But note that there is
never any guarantee that P2 is at all related to or follows P1. P2 could
drift radically away from P1, and there would be no way to tell, nor relay
knowledge of any change back into the physical world.

Also note: all the information P1 ever brings into the physical world, or
relays to their closest friends about their own thoughts, consciousness,
feelings, etc. is done so without ever having access to the qualia which
are causally locked away in P2. P1's access to its own thoughts is as
limited as a hypothetical zombie's access is, since P2 is causally inert.
In this sense, P1 can never know, nor prove that it is not a zombie, it
knows as much about itself as any zombie can know about itself. P1 knows
nothing about what qualia as experienced by P2 feel like, it has no access
to this information, and cannot communicate it to the outside world.

When a conscious person says "I think, therefore I am" such speech is
driven entirely by causally determined physical changes of P1, and
therefore is done completely without any help from P2, and in a zombie who
lacks a "P2", would also say "I think, therefore I am", so the one saying
this is P1, not the experiencer of the qualia who identifies themselves
with P2. The experiencer of the qualia in P2 cannot do anything, cannot say
anything, cannot even choose to lift a finger if their life depended on it.
For all intents and purposes, we can ignore the existence of P2.

At least, all of the above follows as a necessary conclusion when one
presumes that zombies are possible.

Even if zombies are possible people can still apply this observation to
> themselves, but will remain uncertain of other people’s consciousness. I
> don’t see any logical contradiction in the idea that consciousness has a
> component that isn’t physically detectable, but may be observable
> consciously. I do believe that all properties of consciousness are
> physically detectable, but am not convinced that this is logically
> necessary.
>

The logical contradiction comes into play when one says both that:
1. A conscious person is more consciousness than their zombie twin

>From the possibility of zombies, it follows that the P1 of a conscious
person, and P1 of their zombie twin are exactly the same in terms of their
conscious awareness. The P1 of a conscious person has no more access,
reportability, information, knowledge, or insight into their qualia (locked
away in P2) than does the P1 of their zombie twin. Both are equivalently
conscious, which contravenes the assumption made in 1.

Jason

>
> On May 17, 2023, at 7:34 AM, Jason Resch via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, May 17, 2023, 4:19 AM efc--- via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>> Good morning,
>>
>
>
> Thanks, to you as well! Or good afternoon depending on when and where you
> receive this. ��
>
>
>> On Tue, 16 May 2023, Jason Resch via extropy-chat wrote:
>>
>> > It follows from corrolary 4 that we as physical beings can have no more
>> access to this information than any zombie does, i.e. we have
>> > no more (or less) access to our own mental states than does a zombie.
>>
>> This is what I thought. Can someone explain to me how believers in
>> zombies motivate that other people are not zombies?
>
>
> Brent would say there's some special molecule in our brains. Searle would
> say there's some unique causal power in our biology. Chalmers would say
> there's some extra property in our universe which enables consciousnesses
> to accompany certain causal organizations (which is not logically necessary
> in other conceivable universes). Dualists would say God puts a soul into
> each human (but they never say why God could not put a soul into a machine).
>
> They must point to a
>> clear criterion and say this is "not zombie", and lacking that, you are
>> a zombie.
>>
>> It seems to me the only non-zombie there can ever be with that point of
>> view, is oneself.
>
>
> Yes I think they accept this. If it's logically possible for a physically
> identical being to behave in all manners in the same ways, and not be
> conscious, then there can be no test to determine if another is conscious.
>
> Moreover, there can be no test anyone could perform to know they're not
> themselves a zombie (this point is often overlooked by believers in zombies
> but it follows from their belief that qualia have no effects in the world).
>
> Dennett realizes this second point which is why he says that if zombies
> were possible then we're all zombies.
>
> Jason
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