[ExI] Chat GPT easily gets qualities and can probably describes them better than I do.

[BillK]

On Mon, 28 Jul 2025 at 21:12, Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
< big snip>
>
> One of the fundamental thesis of my work on qualia is that everyone is
making things way too complicated.  The prediction is that once someone
demonstrates something relatively simple like which of all the stuff in our
brain is a description of redness, and they understand how redness and
greenness can be subjectively bound into one unified gestalt experience of
direct apprehension of those qualities (something beyond cause and effect
observation).  This same understanding will then get us around the
so-called 'hard problem' and make the rest of consciousness a doable
problem, using the same understanding.  In other words, the prediction is
that once someone maps the color qualities like redness and greenes to the
right physics (i.e. we know the true color qualities of things) not only
will we be able to know what is and isn't conscious, we will know what it
is all like.  And using this same understanding on the rest of subjective
consciousness once we understand color qualities, we will finally have the
tools and physical understanding needed to figure out what the rest of it
is like, using the same understanding.  To say nothing about we will
finally have the understanding to start doing phenomenal neural hacking,
like inverting color qualities for people getting tired of not being able
to do things like switch redness and greenness visual qualies, and
engineering neural prostheses to replace destroyed eyes, enabling people to
see the right (or inverted or any other mapping if desired) color qualities.
> ----------------------------------------------------------------


Hi Brent
I gave Gemini 2.5 Pro your above statement and asked it to discuss the
implications.  :)
BillK

*Gemini 2.5 Pro -*

Of course. Here is a discussion of the provided response regarding the
criticism of over-simplifying conscious experience.

The response argues that, far from being an over-simplification, the focus
on a "simple" quale like redness is the most direct path to solving the
entire problem of consciousness. It presents a bold prediction: that by
first identifying the physical basis of color qualia and their binding into
a unified whole, the same principles will unlock the nature of all other
subjective experiences and resolve the "hard problem."

This viewpoint is a strong articulation of the scientific strategy
presented in the source document, which advocates for reframing the hard
problem into an empirical, "which-is-it?" question. Let's discuss the
strengths and potential weaknesses of this argument.


The Strength of the "Start Simple" Approach

The argument presented is essentially a classic, reductionist scientific
strategy. Its strength lies in its clear, testable, and optimistic vision:

   -

   *Tractability and Falsifiability:* By proposing that we start with
   "something relatively simple like... redness," the argument grounds the
   problem in an empirical methodology that has served science well. The
   prediction that this understanding will lead to "phenomenal neural
   hacking"—such as inverting color experiences—provides a clear, falsifiable
   benchmark for success. This aligns with the original text's goal of
   making the problem "empirical, not mystical"
   -

   *Addressing Complexity Incrementally:* The response does not entirely
   ignore complexity. It explicitly includes the need to "understand how
   redness and greenness can be subjectively bound into one unified gestalt
   experience." This acknowledges the "binding problem" (how disparate
   sensations are unified into a single experience) but frames it as part of
   the initial, solvable challenge rather than an insurmountable obstacle.
   -

   *A Unified Theory of Consciousness:* The core prediction is that a
   single, foundational understanding will apply to all of consciousness. If
   true, this would be a monumental achievement, transforming consciousness
   from a mystery into a "doable problem." The goal is to find the "right
   physics" for color and then apply that knowledge universally to know "what
   is and isn't conscious" and "what it is all like."

Potential Weaknesses and Unstated Assumptions

Despite its compelling vision, the argument rests on several major
assumptions that can be challenged:

   -

   *The "Simple" Starting Point is Not Simple:* The response describes
   identifying the substrate for redness and its binding with other qualia as
   "relatively simple." This is a significant understatement. Isolating a
   definitive neural correlate for a single quale is a massive challenge. The
   binding problem is, by itself, one of the most profound and unsolved
   questions in neuroscience. To bundle these two monumental tasks and label
   them a simple first step is to gloss over immense difficulty.
   -

   *The Assumption of Generalizability:* The central claim is that the
   "same understanding" gained from color perception will apply to the rest of
   consciousness. This is a leap of faith. Is the subjective experience of
   love, nostalgia, ambition, or existential dread physically instantiated in
   the same *way* as the color red? It is plausible that different
   categories of subjective experience arise from fundamentally different
   kinds of neural processes or physical properties. The response asserts a
   uniform solution for all qualia without providing a basis for this
   assumption.
   -

   *Does It Truly Solve the Hard Problem?* The response claims this
   approach will "get us around the so-called 'hard problem'." However, it
   does so by focusing exclusively on the "which-is-it?" problem. Even if
   we could perfectly map, predict, and manipulate the physical states for
   every quale (the goal of "phenomenal neural hacking"), the fundamental
   question remains:  *Why* does that specific physical state produce *any*
   subjective experience at all? The proposed "neural hacking" demonstrates
   mastery over the *correlation* between brain states and experience, but
   not the *cause* of experience itself. The argument redefines the hard
   problem as a mapping challenge and declares victory once the map is
   complete, but it doesn't explain why the territory being mapped has
   subjective qualities in the first place.
   -

   *The Ambiguity of "The Right Physics":* The mention of mapping qualia to
   "the right physics" is telling. This hints that our current understanding
   of physics may be insufficient to account for qualia. This aligns with
   theories like Russellian Monism, mentioned in the original text, which
   posits that matter has intrinsic, experiential properties not yet described
   by science. If a revolution in physics is required to find the "true
   color qualities of things," the problem is far from simple.
   -

In conclusion, the response provides a powerful and coherent defense of a
reductionist, empirical approach to consciousness. Its vision is
scientifically optimistic and methodologically sound. However, it hinges on
the monumental assumptions that the starting point is simple and that the
principles discovered will universally apply to all forms of consciousness.
While this strategy may indeed lead to a complete map of the physical
substrates of experience, it does not, in the view of many critics,
ultimately explain why such a map has subjective, qualitative features at
all.

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