[ExI] I hate to say it but, I agree with Trump

[John Clark]

On Wed, Sep 2, 2026 at 2:13 PM <spike at rainier66.com> wrote:


*>>…Apparently the current POTUS likes to "troll" Iranians too…John K Clark*
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> *>The long term result is that a known vulnerability, the Strait of
> Hormuz, is having oil pipelines built around it as fast as the neighboring
> countries can throw them under the ground. *
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*I asked your favorite AI Grok the following question: *

*ME: **Because of Trump's war with Iran the Strait of Hormuz is closed so
some of the countries in the area are building oil pipelines, is it
feasible that a pipeline could replace all the shipping that once went
through that Strait, and if so how long would it take to build it?*

*Grok: " **No, pipelines cannot fully replace the ~20 million barrels per
day (mb/d) of crude oil, condensate, and petroleum products that normally
transit the Strait of Hormuz, and even substantial expansions would leave a
large residual volume dependent on the waterway (or other workarounds) for
years.* Pre-crisis flows averaged about 20 mb/d in 2024–2025 (roughly 15
mb/d crude/condensate + ~5 mb/d products), equivalent to ~20% of global
petroleum liquids consumption and more than a quarter of seaborne oil trade.
Existing Bypass Capacity

Only a few operational pipelines meaningfully bypass the Strait:

   - *Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline (Petroline)*: ~1,200 km from
   eastern fields (Abqaiq area) to Yanbu on the Red Sea. Nameplate/design
   capacity has been cited around 5 mb/d, with reported surge capability to ~7
   mb/d. Actual sustainable export throughput is constrained by Yanbu
   terminal/loading infrastructure (often estimated in the 4–5+ mb/d export
   range after domestic refining needs). It has been a major lifeline during
   the disruption.
   - *UAE’s Habshan–Fujairah (ADCOP) pipeline*: ~360–400 km to Fujairah on
   the Gulf of Oman (outside the Strait). Capacity ~1.5–1.8 mb/d.
   - Smaller or partial options: Iran’s Goreh–Jask line (nameplate often
   cited ~0.35–1 mb/d but limited utilization/throughput); Iraq’s
   Kirkuk–Ceyhan (Turkey) line (nominal higher but historically constrained by
   politics, disputes, and under-utilization, recently operating at lower
   levels like hundreds of thousands of b/d).

Pre-crisis estimates of *available* spare capacity on the main Saudi + UAE
routes were typically in the 3.5–5.5 mb/d range (IEA). Combined nameplate
figures are higher (~6.5–8+ mb/d depending on assumptions), but real-world
utilization, terminal bottlenecks, product vs. crude differences, and
security risks limit effective replacement to well under half of normal
Hormuz volumes. Other Gulf exporters (Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain) have
far less or no comparable independent pipeline access.

Products and LNG face additional challenges, as infrastructure was largely
designed around maritime export via the Strait.
Expansion Projects and Timelines

Countries are accelerating expansions and new lines because of the
disruption (which began around late February 2026 with sharply reduced
traffic). Key developments include:

   - *UAE*: A second/parallel West-East pipeline to Fujairah is under
   construction (reported ~50% complete in mid-2026) and fast-tracked for 2027
   operation. This is expected to roughly double UAE bypass capacity to ~3.6
   mb/d. Port/terminal expansions at Fujairah are also needed.
   - *Saudi Arabia*: Considering further expansion of the East-West system
   (potentially +1–2 mb/d) and related terminal upgrades at Yanbu or other Red
   Sea sites. Timelines are multi-year (often cited toward 2028–2029 for
   meaningful additions).
   - *Iraq and others*: Rehabilitation/expansion of northern routes (e.g.,
   Kirkuk–Ceyhan), possible new internal lines (e.g., Basra–Haditha
   connections toward Mediterranean outlets via Turkey or Syria), and
   cross-border concepts. These face political, security, and coordination
   hurdles. *Timelines for major new capacity are typically 3–5+ years once
   underway; ambitious cross-border “super” pipelines could take 5–7 years or
   more and cost tens of billions.*
   - Broader estimates (e.g., Goldman Sachs analysis of multiple projects):
   Potential to raise effective bypass capacity significantly—adding several
   mb/d by end-2027 (base case supporting insulation of ~45% of pre-war Gulf
   exports) and more by end-2028 (toward 60% or higher in optimistic
   scenarios, with total bypass approaching 14+ mb/d in some projections).
   Even optimistic outcomes leave a substantial residual (often cited as
   potentially >10 mb/d still needing maritime routes for full pre-war Gulf
   export levels).

Major pipeline projects are capital-intensive, involve engineering across
difficult terrain (desert, mountains), require pumping stations, terminals,
storage, and often political agreements for cross-border routes.
Construction alone commonly takes several years; full system integration
and debottlenecking (especially ports) add time. Domestic expansions (UAE
parallel line, Saudi upgrades) move faster than multinational ones.
Historical precedents (e.g., original East-West pipeline in the 1980s
during the Iran-Iraq War) show strategic value but also that full
substitution is not rapid.
Feasibility Assessment

Pipelines can (and already do) meaningfully reduce dependence and provide
resilience for Saudi and UAE volumes, and expansions will increase that
share over the next 1–3+ years. They cannot replace *all* shipping through
the Strait in any practical near- or medium-term horizon because:

   - Scale mismatch: Existing + near-term expansions cover only a fraction
   to roughly half (or somewhat more under optimistic multi-year buildout) of
   the ~20 mb/d baseline.
   - Geography and logistics: Not all production is easily connected;
   products and *LNG are harder; terminals become bottlenecks; security
   risks shift but do not disappear (pipelines and terminals can be targeted).*
   - Residual volumes: Analysts (including IEA commentary) note that even
   after major projects, significant volumes would still need to move by sea
   for full recovery of Gulf exports.
   - Alternatives like ship-to-ship transfers, dark shipping, longer
   maritime routes (e.g., around Africa), or production shifts elsewhere
   provide partial offsets but are costlier, slower, or limited in scale.

In short, pipelines are a critical hedge and are being expanded as a direct
response to the disruption, but they are a partial, multi-year solution
rather than a complete substitute. *Full replacement of Hormuz shipping
capacity is not feasible with currently planned or readily expandable
infrastructure on any short timeline; the Strait (or equivalent maritime
access) remains structurally important for the foreseeable future*.
Timelines for material additional capacity are measured in years (key UAE
expansion targeted for 2027; broader gains into 2028 and beyond), not
months.

> *Canadian oil resources, once dormant, are being reactivated. *
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*Canadian oil reserves will not do us any good until we get rid of Trump's
brain dead dumb tariffs. And that's not gonna happen until we get a
president that is less brain dead dumb. *

* John K Clark*

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