[Paleopsych] spiked: Why humans are superior to apes

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Why humans are superior to apes
http://www.spiked-online.com/Printable/0000000CA40E.htm
4.2.24

by Helene Guldberg

Humanism, in the sense of a faith in humanity's potential to solve
problems through the application of science and reason, is taking
quite a battering today. As the UK medical scientist Raymond Tallis
warns, the role of mind and of self-conscious agency in human affairs
is denied 'by anthropomorphising or "Disneyfying" what animals do and
"animalomorphising" what human beings get up to' (1).

One of the most extreme cases of 'animalomorphism' in recent years has
come from the philosopher John Gray, professor of European thought at
the London School of Economics. In his book Straw Dogs: Thoughts on
Humans and Other Animals, Gray argues that humanity's belief in our
ability to control our destiny and free ourselves from the constraints
of the natural environment is as illusory as the Christian promise of
salvation (2).

Gray presents humanity as no better than any other living organism -
even bacteria. We should therefore not be too concerned about whether
humans have a future on this planet, he claims. Rather, it is the
balance of the world's ecosystem that we should really worry about:
'Homo rapiens is only one of very many species, and not obviously
worth preserving. Later or sooner, it will become extinct. When it is
gone the Earth will recover.'

Thankfully, not many will go along with John Gray's image of humans as
a plague upon the planet. For our own sanity, if nothing else, we
cannot really subscribe to such a misanthropic and nihilistic
worldview. If we did, surely we would have no option other than to
kill ourselves - for the good of the planet - and try to take as many
people with us as possible?

However, even if many will reject Gray's extreme form of
anti-humanism, many more will go along with the notion that animals
are ultimately not that different from us. The effect is the same: to
denigrate human abilities.

Today, a belief in human exceptionalism is distinctly out of fashion.
Almost every day we are presented with new revelations about how
animals are more like us than we ever imagined. A selection of news
headlines includes: 'How animals kiss and make up'; 'Male birds punish
unfaithful females'; 'Dogs experience stress at Christmas'; 'Capuchin
monkeys demand equal rights'; 'Scientists prove fish intelligence';
'Birds going through divorce proceedings'; 'Bees can think say
scientists'; 'Chimpanzees are cultured creatures' (3).

The argument is at its most powerful when it comes to the great apes
-chimpanzees, gorillas and orangutans. One of the most influential
opponents of the 'sanctification of human life', as he describes human
exceptionalism, is Peter Singer, author of Animal Liberation and
co-founder of the Great Ape Project (4). Singer argues that we need to
'break the species barrier' and extend rights to the great apes, in
the first instance, followed by all other animal species. The great
apes are not only our closest living relatives, argues Singer, but
they are also beings who possess many of the characteristics that we
have long considered distinctive to humans.

Is it the case that apes are just like us? Primatology has indeed
shown that apes, and even monkeys, communicate in the wild. Jane
Goodall's observations of chimpanzees show that not only do they use
tools, but that they also make them - using sticks to fish for
termites, stones as anvils or hammers, and leaves as cups or sponges.
Anybody watching juvenile chimps playfighting, tickling each other and
giggling, will be struck by their human-like mannerisms and their
apparent expressions of glee.

But one has to go beyond first impressions in order to establish to
what extent great ape abilities can be compared to those of humans. Is
it the case that ape behaviour is the result of a capacity for some
rudimentary form of human-like insight? Or can it be explained through
Darwinian evolution and associative learning? Associative learning, or
contingent learning, are concepts developed in the early twentieth
century by BF Skinner, one of the most influential psychologists, to
describe a type of learning that is the result of an association
between an action and the reinforcer - in the absence of any insight.
BF Skinner became famous for his work with rats, pigeons and chickens
using his 'Skinner Box'. In one experiment he rewarded chickens with a
small amount of food (the reinforcer) when they pecked a blue button
(the action). If the chicken pecked a yellow, green, or red button, it
would get nothing. Associative or contingent learning, concepts
developed by the school of behaviourism, is based on the idea that
animals behave in the way that they do because this kind of behaviour
has had certain consequences in the past, not because they have any
insight into why they are doing what they do.

In Intelligence of Apes and Other Rational Beings (2003),
primatologist Duane Rumbaugh and comparative psychologist David
Washburn argue that ape behaviour cannot be explained on the basis of
contingent learning alone (5). Apes are rational, they claim, and do
make decisions using higher order reasoning skills. But the evidence
for this is weak, and getting weaker, as more rigorous methodologies
are being developed for investigating the capabilities of primates. As
a result, many of the past claims about apes' capacity for insight
into their own actions and those of their fellow apes are now being
questioned.

Cultural transmission and social learning

The cultural transmission of behaviour, where actions are passed on
through some kind of teaching, learning or observation rather than
through genetics, is used as evidence of apes' higher order reasoning
abilities. This is currently being revised.
The generation-upon-generation growth in human abilities has
historically been seen as our defining characteristic. Human progress
has been made possible through our ability to reflect on what we, and
our fellow humans, are doing - thereby teaching, and learning from,
each other.

The first evidence of cultural transmission among primates was found
in the 1950s in Japan, with observations of the spread of potato
washing among macaque monkeys (6). One juvenile female pioneered the
habit, followed by her mother and closest peers. Within a decade, the
whole of the population under middle age was washing potatoes. A
review by Andrew Whiten and his colleagues of a number of field
studies reveals evidence of at least 39 local variations in
behavioural patterns, including tool-use, communication and grooming
rituals, among chimpanzees - behaviours that are common in some
communities and absent in others (7). So it seems that these animals
are capable of learning new skills and of passing them on to their
fellows.

The question remains: what does this tell us about their mental
capacities? The existence of cultural transmission is often taken as
evidence that the animals are capable of some form of social learning
(such as imitation) and possibly even teaching. But there is in fact
no evidence of apes being able to teach their young. Michael
Tomasello, co-director of the Wolfgang Köhler Primate Research Center
in Germany, points out that 'nonhuman primates do not point to distal
entities in the environment, they do not hold up objects for others to
see and share, and they do not actively give or offer objects to other
individuals. They also do not actively teach one another' (8).

Yet even if apes cannot actively teach each other, if they are capable
of social learning - in terms of imitation (which it has long been
assumed that they are) - this does still imply they are capable of
quite complex cognitive processes. Imitation involves being able to
appreciate not just what an act looks like when performed by another
individual, but also what it is like to do that act oneself. They must
be able to put themselves in another person's shoes, so to speak.
However, comparative psychologist Bennett Galef points out, after
scrutinising the data from Japan, that the rate the behaviour spread
among the macaque monkeys was very slow and steady, not accelerated as
one might expect in the case of imitation (9). It took up to a decade
for what, in human terms, would be described as a tiny group of
individuals to acquire the habit of the 'innovator'. Compare this to
the human ability to teach new skills and ways of thinking and to
learn from each other's insights: which laid the foundation for the
agricultural and industrial revolutions, the development of science
and technology and the transformations of our ways of living that flow
from these.

Reviewing the literature on primate behaviour, it emerges that there
is in fact no consensus among scientists as to whether apes are
capable of the simplest form of social learning - imitation (10).
Instead it could be the case that the differences in their behavioural
repertoires are the result of what has been coined stimulus
enhancement. It has been shown in birds, for instance, that the
stimulus enhancement of a feeding site may occur if bird A sees bird B
gaining food there. In other words, their attention has been drawn to
a stimulus, without any knowledge or appreciation of the significance
of the stimulus.
Others argue that local variations may be due to observational
conditioning, where an animal may learn about the positive or negative
consequences of actions, not on the basis of experiencing the outcomes
themselves, but on the basis of seeing the responses of other animals.

This involves a form of associative learning (learning from the
association between an action and the reinforcer), rather than any
insight.

Michael Tomasello emphasises the special nature of human learning.
Unlike animals, he argues, humans understand that in the social domain
relations between people involve intentionality, and in the physical
domain that relations between objects involve causality (11). We do
not tend to respond blindly to what others do or say, but, to some
degree, analyse their motives. Similarly we have some understanding
how physical processes work, which means we can manipulate the
physical world to our advantage and continually develop and perfect
the tools we use to do so.

Social learning and teaching depends on these abilities, and human
children begin on this task at the end of their first year. Because
other primates do not understand intentionality or causality they do
not engage in cultural learning of this type.
The fact that it takes chimps up to four years to acquire the
necessary skills to select and adequately use tools to crack nuts
implies that they are not capable of true imitation, never mind any
form of teaching. Young chimps invest a lot of time and effort in
attempts to crack nuts that are, after all, an important part of their
diet. The slow rate of their development raises serious questions
about their ability to reflect on what they and their fellow apes are
doing.

Language

But can apes use language? Groundbreaking research by Robert Seyfarth
and Dorothy Cheney in the 1980s on vervet monkeys in the wild showed
that their vocalisations went beyond merely expressing emotions such
as anger or fear. Their vocalisations could instead be described as
'referential' - in that they refer to objects or events (12). But it
could not be established from these studies whether the callers
vocalised with the explicit intent of referring to a particular object
or event, for instance the proximity of a predator.
And Seyfarth and Cheney were careful to point out that there was no
evidence that the monkeys had any insight into what they were doing.
Their vocalisations could merely be the result of a form of
associative learning. Later experiments have attempted to refine
analyses in order to establish whether there is an intention to
communicate: involving an understanding that someone else may have a
different perspective or understanding of a situation from themselves,
and using communication in order to change the others' understanding.

It is too early to draw any firm conclusions on this question from
research carried out to date. There is no evidence that primates have
any, even rudimentary, human-like insight into the effect of their
communications. But neither is there clear evidence that they do not.
What is clear, however, is that primates, as with all non-human
animals, only ever communicate about events in the here and now. They
do not communicate about possible future events or previously
encountered ones.

Ape communications cannot therefore be elevated to the status of human
language. Human beings debate and discuss ideas, constructing
arguments, drawing on past experiences and imagining future
possibilities, in order to change the opinions of others. This goes
way beyond warning fellow humans about a clear and present danger.

Deception and Theory of Mind

What about the fact that apes have been seen to deceive their fellows?
Does this not point towards what some have described as a
Machiavellian Intelligence (13)? Primatologists have observed apes in
the wild giving alarm calls when no danger is present, with the effect
of distracting another animal from food or a mate. But again the
question remains whether they are aware of what they are doing. To be
able to deceive intentionally, they would have to have some form of a
'theory of mind' - that is, the recognition that one's own
perspectives and beliefs are sometimes different from somebody else's.

Although psychologist Richard Byrne argues that the abilities of the
great apes are limited compared with even very young humans, he claims
that 'some "theory of mind" in great apes but not monkeys now seems
clear' (14). However, as the cognitive neuroscientist Marc Hauser
points out, most studies of deception have left the question of
intentionality unanswered (15). Studies that do attribute
beliefs-about-beliefs to apes tend to rely heavily on fascinating, but
largely unsubstantiated, anecdotes. As professor of archaeology Steven
Mithen points out, 'even the most compelling examples can be explained
in terms of learned behavioural contingencies [associative learning],
without recourse to higher order intentionality' (16).
So even if apes are found to deceive, that does not necessarily imply
that the apes know that they are deceiving. The apes may just be
highly adaptive and adept at picking up useful routines that bring
them food, sex or safety, without necessarily having any understanding
or insight into what they are doing.

Self-awareness

Although there is no substantive evidence of apes having a theory of
mind, they may possess its precursor - a rudimentary self-awareness.
This is backed up by the fact that, apart from human beings, apes are
the only species able to recognise themselves in the mirror. In
developmental literature, the moment when human infants first
recognise themselves in the mirror (between 15 and 21 months of age)
is seen as an important milestone in the emergence of the notion of
'self'. How important is it, then, that apes can make the same sort of
mirror recognition?

The development of self-awareness is a complex process with different
elements emerging at different times. In humans, mirror recognition is
only the precursor to a continually developing capacity for
self-awareness and self-evaluation. Younger children's initial
self-awareness is focused around physical characteristics. With
maturity comes a greater appreciation of psychological
characteristics. When asking 'who am I?', younger children use outer
visible characteristics - such as gender and hair colour - while older
children tend to use inner attributes - such as feelings and
abilities.

The ability of apes to recognise themselves in the mirror does not
necessarily imply a human-like self-awareness or the existence of
mental experiences. They seem able to represent their own bodies
visually, but they never move beyond the stage reached by human
children in their second year of life.

Children

Research to date presents a rather murky picture of what primates are
and are not capable of. Field studies may not have demonstrated
conclusively that apes are incapable of understanding intentionality
in the social domain or causality in the physical domain, but
logically this must be the case. Understanding of this sort would lead
to a much more flexible kind of learning. It may be the case that the
great apes do possess some rudimentary form of human-like insight. But
the limitations of this rudimentary insight (if it exists at all)
becomes clear when exploring the emergence, and transformative nature,
of insight in young children.

We are not born with the creative, flexible and imaginative thinking
that characterises humans. It emerges in the course of development:
humans develop from helpless biological beings into conscious beings
with a sense of self and an independence of thought.
The study of children can therefore give us great insights into the
human mind. As Peter Hobson, professor of developmental
psychopathology and author of The Cradle of Thought: Exploring the
Origins of Thinking, states: 'It is always difficult to consider
things in the abstract, and this is especially the case when what we
are considering is something as elusive as the development of thought.
It is one of the great benefits of studying very young children that
one can see thinking taking place as it is lived out in a child's
observable behaviour' (17). Thinking is more internalised, and
therefore hidden, in older children and adults, but it is more
externalised and nearer to the surface in children who are just
beginning to talk.

Hobson puts a persuasive case for human thought, language, and
self-awareness developing 'in the cradle of emotional engagement
between the infant and caregiver'. Emotional engagement and
communication, he argues, are the foundation on which creative
symbolic thought develops.

Through reviewing an array of clinical and experimental studies,
Hobson captures aspects of human exchanges that happen before thought.
He shows that even in early infancy children have a capacity to react
to the emotions of others. This points to an innate desire to engage
with fellow human beings, he argues. However, with development, that
innate desire is transformed into something qualitatively different.
So, for instance, at around nine months of age, infants begin to share
their experiences of objects or actions with others. They begin to
monitor the emotional responses of adults, such as responding to
facial expression or the tone of voice. When faced with novel
situations or objects, infants look at their carers' faces and, by
picking up emotional signals, they decide on their actions. When they
receive positive/encouraging signals, they engage; when the signals
are anxious/negative, they retreat. Towards the middle of the second
year these mutually sensitive interpersonal engagements are
transformed into more conscious exchanges of feelings, views and
beliefs.

Hobson is able to show that the ability to symbolise emerges out of
the cradle of early emotional engagements. With the insight that
people-with-minds have their own subjective experiences and can give
things meanings comes the insight that these meanings can be anchored
in symbols. This, according to Hobson, is the dawn of thought and the
dawn of language: 'At this point, [the child] leaves infancy behind.
Empowered by language and other forms of symbolic functioning, she
takes off into the realms of culture. The infant has been lifted out
of the cradle of thought. Engagement with others has taught this soul
to fly.' (p274)

The Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky showed that a significant moment
in the development of the human individual occurs when language and
practical intelligence converge (18). It is when thought and speech
come together that children's thinking is raised to new heights and
they start acquiring truly human characteristics. Language becomes a
tool of thought allowing children increasingly to master their own
behaviour.

As Vygotsky pointed out, young children will often talk out loud - to
themselves it seems - when carrying out particular tasks. This
'egocentric speech' does not disappear, but gradually becomes
internalised into private inner speech - also known as thought.
Vygotsky and Luria concluded that 'the meeting between speech and
thinking is a major event in the development of the individual; in
fact, it is this connection that raises human thinking to
extraordinary heights' (19). Apes never develop the ability to use
language to regulate their own actions in the way that even toddlers
are able to do.

With the development of language, children's understanding of their
own and other people's minds is transformed. So by three or four years
of age, most children have developed a theory of mind. This involves
an understanding of their own and others' mental life, including the
understanding that others may have false beliefs and that they
themselves may have had false beliefs.

When my nephew Stefan was three years of age, he excitedly told me
that 'this is my right hand [lifting his right hand] and this is my
left hand [lifting his left hand]. But this morning [which is the
phrase he used for anything that has happened in the past] I told
daddy that this was my left hand [lifting his right hand] and this is
my right hand [lifting his left hand]'. He was amused by the fact that
he had been mistaken in his knowledge of what is right and what is
left. He clearly had developed an understanding that people, including
himself, have beliefs about things and that those beliefs can be wrong
as well as right. Once children are able to think about thoughts in
this way, their thinking has been lifted to a different height. The
formal education system requires children to go much further in
turning language and thought in upon themselves. Children must learn
to direct their thought processes in a conscious manner. Above all,
they need to become capable of consciously manipulating symbols.
Literacy and numeracy serve important functions in aiding
communication and manipulating numbers. But, above all, they have
transformative effects on children's thinking, in particular on the
development of abstract thought and reflective processes.

In the influential book Children's Minds, child psychologist Margaret
Donaldson shows that 'those very features of the written word which
encourage awareness of language may also encourage awareness of one's
own thinking and be relevant to the development of intellectual
self-control, with incalculable consequences for the kinds of thinking
which are characteristic of logic, mathematics and the sciences' (20).
The differences in language, tool-use, self-awareness and insight
between apes and humans are vast. A human child, even as young as two
years of age, is intellectually head and shoulders above any ape.

Denigrating humans

As American biological anthropologist Kathleen R Gibson states: 'Other
animals possess elements that are common to human behaviours, but none
reaches the human level of accomplishment in any domain - vocal,
gestural, imitative, technical or social. Nor do other species combine
social, technical and linguistic behaviours into a rich, interactive
and self-propelling cognitive complex.' (21)
In the six million years since the human and ape lines first diverged,
the behaviour and lifestyles of apes have hardly changed. Human
behaviour, relationships, lifestyles and culture clearly have. We have
been able to build upon the achievements of previous generations. In
just the past century we have brought, through constant innovation,
vast improvements to our lives: including better health, longer life
expectancy, higher living standards and more sophisticated means of
communication and transport.

Six million years of ape evolution may have resulted in the emergence
of 39 local behavioural patterns - in tool-use, communication and
grooming rituals. However this has not moved them beyond their
hand-to-mouth existence nor led to any significant changes in the way
they live. Our lives have changed much more in the past decade - in
terms of the technology we use, how we communicate with each other,
and how we form and sustain personal relationships. Considering the
vast differences in the way we live, it is very difficult to sustain
the argument that apes are 'just like us'. What appears to be behind
today's fashionable view of ape and human equivalence is a denigration
of human capacities and human ingenuity. The richness of human
experience is trivialised because human experiences are lowered to,
and equated with, those of animals.

Dr Roger Fouts from the Chimpanzee and Human Communication Institute
expresses this anti-human view well in his statement. '[Human]
intelligence has not only moved us away from our bodies, but from our
families, communities, and even Earth itself. This may be a big
mistake for the survival of our species in the long run.' (22)
Investigations into apes' behaviour could shed some useful light on
how they resemble us - and give us some insight into our evolutionary
past, several million years back. Developing a science true to its
subject matter could give us real insights into what shapes ape
behaviour.

Stephen Budiansky's fascinating book If A Lion Could Talk shows how
evolutionary ecology (the study of how natural selection has equipped
animals to lead the lives they do) is showing us how animals process
information in ways that are uniquely their own, much of which we can
only marvel at (23). But as Karl Marx pointed out in the late
nineteenth century: 'What distinguishes the worst architect from the
best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in
imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labour
process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of
the labourer at its commencement.'(24)

Much animal behaviour is fascinating. But, as Budiansky shows, it is
also the case that animals do remarkably stupid things in situations
very similar to those where they previously seemed to show a degree of
intelligence. This is partly because they learn many of their clever
feats by pure accident. But it is also because animal learning is
highly specialised. Their ability to learn is not a result of general
cognitive processes but 'specialised channels attuned to an animal's
basic hard-wired behaviours' (23).

It is sloppy simply to apply human characteristics and motives to
animals. It blocks our understanding of what is specific about animal
behaviour, and degrades what is unique about our humanity.
It is ironic that we, who have something that no other organism has -
the ability to evaluate who we are, where we come from and where we
are going, and, with that, our place in nature - increasingly seem to
use this unique ability in order to downplay the exceptional nature of
our own capacities and achievements.

Read on:
[2]spiked-issue: Animals

(1) New Humanist, November 2003
(2) Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Humans and Other Animals, by John Gray,
Granta, August 2002
(3) [3]'How animals kiss and make up', BBC News, 13 October 2003;
[4]Male birds punish unfaithful females, Animal Sentience, 31 October;
[5]Dogs experience stress at Christmas, Animal Sentience, 10 December
2003; [6]Capuchin monkeys demand equal rights, Animal Sentience, 20
September 2003; [7]Scientists prove fish intelligence, 31 August 2003;
[8]Birds going through divorce proceedings, Animal Sentience, 18
August 2003; [9]Bees can think say scientists, Guardian, 19 April
2001; [10]Chimpanzees are cultured creatures, Guardian, 24 September
2002
(4) See the [11]Great Ape project website
(5) Intelligence of Apes and Other Rational Beings, by Duane M
Rumbaugh and David A Washburn (buy this book from [12]Amazon (UK) or
[13]Amazon (USA))
(6) Frans de Waal, Nature, Vol 399, 17 June 1999
(7) Nature, Vol 399, 17 June 1999
(8) Michael Tomasello, 'Primate Cognition: Introduction to the issue',
Cognitive Science Vol 24 (3) 2000, p358
(9) BG Galef, Human Nature 3, 157-178, 1990
(10) See a detailed review by Andrew Whiten, 'Primate Culture and
Social Learning', Cognitive Science Vol 24 (3), 2000
(11) Tomasello and Call, Primate Cognition, Oxford University Press,
1997
(12) [14]Peter Singer: Curriculum Vitae
(13) Machiavellian Intelligence: Social Expertise and the Evolution of
Intellect in Monkeys, Apes, and Humans, (eds) Andrew Whiten and
Richard Byrne, Oxford 1990. Buy this book from [15]Amazon (USA) or
[16]Amazon (UK)
(14) [17]How primates learn novel complex skills: The evolutionary
origins of generative planning?, by Richard W Byrne
(15) M Hauser, 'A primate dictionary?', Cognitive Science Vol 24(3)
2000
(16) The Prehistory of the Mind: A Search for the Origins of Art,
Religion and Science, Steven Mithen, Phoenix, 1998. Buy this book from
or [18]Amazon (UK) or [19]Amazon (USA)
(17) The Cradle of Thought: exploring the origins of thinking, Peter
Hobson, Macmillan, 22 February 2002, p76. Buy this book from
[20]Amazon (UK) or [21]Amazon (USA)
(18) Thought and Language, Lev Vygotsky, MIT, 1986
(19) Ape, Primitive Man and Child, Lev Vygotsky, 1991, p140
(20) Children's Minds, Margaret Donaldson, HarperCollins, 1978, p95
(21) Tools, Language and Cognition in Human Evolution, Kathleen R
Gibson, 1993, p7-8
(22) [22]CHCI Frequently Asked Questions: Chimpanzee Facts
(23) If a Lion Could Talk: Animal Intelligence and the Evolution of
Consciousness, by Stephen Budiansky. Buy this book from [23]Amazon
(UK) or [24]Amazon (USA)
(24) Capital, Karl Marx, vol 1 p198
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33. http://www.spiked-online.com/sections/science/index.htm
34. http://www.spiked-online.com/sections/technology/index.htm
35. http://www.spiked-online.com/forms/genEmail.asp?sendto=9&section=central