[ExI] consciousness and perception
brent.allsop at comcast.net
Sat Jan 24 22:46:36 UTC 2009
No, most other representationalists do not agree with me, that nature
has phenomenal properties.
Chalmers (at least he argues this point in the paper mentioned in that
camp), Steve Lehar, Stathis Papaiuanue, and other's sub camp on this
issue is represented here:
The scientific consensus at that level is clearly for that camp.
My camp, a competitor to the above is here:
Though we disagree on just what qualia are, we do agree that perception
is representational, as stated in the parent super camp we are all in here:
From how you described what I tried to say, you clearly didn't
understand what I was trying to say. I apologize for it not being more
Damien Broderick wrote:
> At 12:27 PM 1/24/2009 -0700, Brent wrote:
>> in addition to these behavioral properties, something about atoms
>> also has phenomenal qualities like red, green, the taste of salt....
>> Very different than behavioral properties. The atoms don't generate
>> subjectivity, they simply have the phenomenal qualities subjectivity
>> is made of.
> NO NO NO NO. I don't think even Chalmers claims that (but maybe he
> does, he says a lot of strange things). Do you really suppose that the
> carbon and other atoms in a working cow muscle have *intrinsic*
> "leggish" phenomenal qualities that mysteriously morph into "yuckish
> rotten" phenomenal qualities if the steak is left out for the maggots
> to get at? Or is that too high-level? But there is no red-ness,
> either, in atoms, any more than there is yummy-ness or barf-ness.
> Omg, I'm agreeing with John Clark!
> Damien Broderick
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