[ExI] Destructive uploading.

[G. Livick]

Florent,

What you have to say is either hard to argue with, or, if not that, very 
easy to pick up for further discussion.  It is refreshing to see this 
component of the "uploading" concept laid out so clearly.

Just a couple of comments:

"That's when I realized that this whole "original" and "copy" thing was 
an illusion. There is no "real" me, there is just a pattern that creates 
the experience of me, a pattern that doesn't "belong" to me but just 
exists because atoms have arranged themselves in this particular way. 
This experience and consciousness is the same for every identical 
pattern, regardless of how these patterns evolved and where they come 
from. There is no "true" one, physics don't work that way. We must 
understand that there's nothing special about us."

Well, yes and no...  That there is nothing special about us is clear.  
We are made from the same atoms from which everything else is made.  
However, with such a realization being of great value in other places, 
it doesn't help us in grappling with the main issue here: the mind is 
not made up of atoms, only the necessary correlate of the mind is 
constructed.

As a follow-on to that,

"As counter-intuitive as it is, there is nothing to be afraid of 
concerning destructive uploading, the pattern that makes your 
consciousness is the only thing that matters. Gradually transferring a 
mind is no different tha[n] destroying it [and] recreating it. Nobody 
else would make the difference and neither would you, because there 
isn't any."

Uploading, as I've seen it defined in this group so far, involves 
determining the exact physical location of every neuron, axon, dendrite 
and synapse, and mapping all those into a computer in some fashion.  
Clearly, although proponents tend to gloss over the complexities, the 
functioning of each element would be need to be reduced to an equation 
to support a simulation,  and there would need to be some kind of 
executive working to conduct the symphony.  None of this describes the 
uploading of the mind.  The idea that transferring the structure of the 
brain into a database would also upload the mind is the central dogma of 
uploading.  Arguments pertaining to the central dogma that a priori 
assume the central dogma make me kind of dizzy.

Going on to assume the central dogma, there is a dilemma that arises 
with uploading, made the more interesting if the process is not 
destructive; which mind contains the individual identity that goes 
forward, if the upload goes onto two computers at the same time?  If we 
don't survive as ourselves when making the transition from carbon to 
silicon, then there is no point to the exercise at all in terms of the 
dogma.  If we continued conscious awareness when doubled, or tripled if 
the process is non-destructive, which one are we aware of, or are we 
aware in multiple places at the same time?  Trying to get my arms around 
going from me into two other simultaneous me's, and then having them 
immediately diverge due to dissimilar experiential development while 
still being me, makes me even more dizzy.

FutureMan








On 9/3/2011 3:07 AM, Florent Berthet wrote:
> I used to think that continuity of consciousness was obviously 
> important for uploading. My reasoning was "if I create a copy of 
> myself, and if I die in the process, that is as if I had created a 
> clone of myself that would be able to live in exchange for my life. 
> But I don't want my clone to survive, I want ME to survive."
>
> So for me, a Star Trek teleporter that disassemble atoms and 
> reassemble them in an other place was out of the question, because it 
> would kill the "real" me.
>
> Then I thought "but when I go to bed, I wake up in the morning made of 
> a slightly different pattern of atoms (dreams have formed new 
> memories, for example). Nevertheless, I feel like I'm "the same" 
> person. But what if I had been scanned during my sleep, destroyed and 
> instantly recreated in my bed? I wouldn't even know it. This wouldn't 
> make a difference. So, what I am afraid of? And if there is no 
> difference, do we "die" each night, waking up as a whole new person? 
> Should I be afraid of fallins asleep?
>
> So I was like "well, my consciousness blacks out for several hours 
> every night, but there's still this background activity that keeps the 
> continuity on... so I'm the same person..." but things started to 
> become not as sharp and obvious, something was bothering me.
>
> I thought: is continuity of consciousness even relevant? I mean, 
> imagine a guy in a coma who goes brain dead for a few moments. If we 
> were to bring him back to life, nobody would say "ha! He died! So he's 
> not the same person now!". So, damn, continuity of consciousness is 
> not relevant...
>
> The only things that could matter now are the actual atoms that 
> compose the brain and body of the guy. So, imagine that during that 
> brief time of brain inactivity, we could change one carbon atom of his 
> brain and replace it with another carbon atom. That wouldn't change a 
> thing, atoms are the same, we take one out and we put another back. 
> Imagine that instead of one atom, we replace a bunch of atoms, well, 
> same thing, nothing has changed. Hell, imagine we replace the whole 
> brain by this process, it's still the same thing! Atoms are the same, 
> the pattern is the same. Physically, nothing has changed.
>
> Another example: if we could instantly move all your atoms 1 cm to le 
> left, I'm sure you would say you would end up the same person. Now if 
> it wasn't instantaneous but if you were out of this world for a 
> millisecond during the process, there's no reason you would object, 
> what would have changed? What about out for one second? One year?
>
> That's when I realized that this whole "original" and "copy" thing was 
> an illusion. There is no "real" me, there is just a pattern that 
> creates the experience of me, a pattern that doesn't "belong" to me 
> but just exists because atoms have arranged themselves in this 
> particular way. This experience and consciousness is the same for 
> every identical pattern, regardless of how these patterns evolved and 
> where they come from. There is no "true" one, physics don't work that 
> way. We must understand that there's nothing special about us.
>
> As counter-intuitive as it is, there is nothing to be afraid of 
> concerning destructive uploading, the pattern that makes your 
> consciousness is the only thing that matters. Gradually transferring a 
> mind is no different that destroying it a recreating it. Nobody else 
> would make the difference and neither would you, because there isn't any.
>
>
>
>
>
> 2011/9/3 Adrian Tymes <atymes at gmail.com <mailto:atymes at gmail.com>>
>
>     2011/9/2 john clark <jonkc at bellsouth.net <mailto:jonkc at bellsouth.net>>
>
>         On *Fri, 9/2/11, Adrian Tymes /<atymes at gmail.com
>         <mailto:atymes at gmail.com>>/* wrote:
>
>         "The original what?"
>
>         "The biological pattern"
>
>         The biological pattern of an animal is the ordered arrangement
>         of cells, and the biological pattern of a cell is the
>         structural framework of a system of atoms; so biological
>         pattern is a function of information on where to place things.
>
>         Information can be duplicated, information can be uploaded,
>         and its meaningless to talk about an original bit of information.
>
>
>     What's proposed to be emulated is the intelligence, not
>     necessarily the animal
>     itself.  Further, an emulation of a thing is, by definition, not
>     actually the thing
>     that is being emulated - even if a single identity may span from
>     original to
>     emulation, and even if the instances are identified by the same name.
>
>     Thus, the silicon and wires that run the informational pattern are
>     not the same
>     as the biological network that originally ran that same
>     informational pattern.
>     "The original", in this case, refers to that biological network,
>     which is replaced
>     by the silicon and wires - even if the informational pattern is
>     maintained during
>     the transition from one to the other.
>
>         what's so original about this mythical beast called "The
>         Original" if every single bit of it has been replaced many
>         many times? I have asked this question often over the last
>         decade on this list but have never once received a straight
>         answer or even the hint of one.
>
>
>     It is akin to a forest.  What is a forest, if not the combination
>     of all the trees
>     within?  But what if every tree is, one by one, replaced - is it
>     the same forest?
>
>     More practically, what about a ship, whose every part is replaced
>     - again, one
>     by one - over decades?  Almost all people will identify it as the
>     "same" ship.
>
>     You argue for and perceive a three dimensional snapshot.  This is
>     where you
>     err.  This is why you are frustrated: you insist that these things
>     are only that
>     which exists in one moment in time - but they are not.  They exist
>     in all four
>     dimensions.  They are collections of things *and* their coherence
>     through time,
>     which allows the parts to be gradually replaced - and, by the same
>     token, does
>     not allow all the parts to be replaced at once.
>
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