[ExI] Red and green qualia

[John Clark]

On Fri, Jun 28, 2019 at 9:46 PM Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at gmail.com> wrote:

John,
>
>
>
>> >>“For example, would the subjective experience of somebody who saw the
>> world in black and white be different from somebody who saw the world in
>> red and black? I don't think it would although we'll never know for sure.
>> ”
>
>
>
> *> I hear you saying something very different (redness vs whiteness) is
> not different? *
>

Difference is indeed the key word because meaning needs contrast and that's
why the best definition of "nothing" I ever heard was "infinite unbounded
homogeneity". I think this is just as true for qualia as anything else, it
is meaningless to speak about qualia in isolation from all other qualia. If
our entire visual field consisted of a unvarying field of red we wouldn't
have a word for "red" or "color" or "vision" because we would be totally
blind and be unaware we were seeing red or seeing anything at all.

*> It could still function the same, is that what you mean? *
>

It would certainly function the same no doubt about that.


> > *Because it would be very qualitatively different, right?*
>

I don't think so because qualia can't get there meaning from something
absolute in themselves, they must obtain meaning from how they contrast
with other qualia. So a world seen in black and white and a world seen in
red and white would certainly not be objectively different and, although we
will never be able to prove it, I don't think it would be subjectively
different either, not quantitatively and not qualitatively.

*> And thanks Dylan for pointing out that red green color blind
> “bichromats” have very different qualia than normal trichromats.*


In that special case there would be a very obvious objective difference so
little stretch would be needed to conclude there would be a subjective
difference too. I would also propose that a man who was blind from birth
would have different color qualia from both you and me.


> *> And of course, your claim “we’ll never know for sure.” is certainly a
> falsifiable claim. *
>

Nobody will ever be able to prove my claim is false and nobody will ever be
able to prove it's correct either, so it's not a scientific statement it's
a philosophical one; in other words my idea does not deserve a lot of deep
thought because, just like *ALL* consciousness theories and very unlike
intelligence theories, it leads precisely nowhere.


> * > Everyone supporting “Representational Qualia Theory
> <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Representational-Qualia/6#statement>” is
> predicting these claims will soon be falsified, once experimentalists stop
> being qualia blind.*
>

I don't find these claims convincing because they all involve radical
merging and alteration of the experimental subject. I don't think you or I
will ever know for certain if we experience the same qualia; someday John
Allsop and Brent Clark might know if they share the same qualia or not but
we won't.

And now, as Monty Python would say, for something completely different:
Today after 46 years I officially retire my job of being a electrical
engineer in order to pursue my goal of becoming a philosopher king, or
maybe just a gentleman of leisure, or maybe just a bum.

 John K Clark
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