[ExI] Mental Phenomena

Brent Allsop brent.allsop at gmail.com
Mon Jan 13 17:52:23 UTC 2020

Hi Rafal,
You are missing the point.  The point is to illustrate that we don't know
what color anything is.  Everyone thinks there is a "hard mind body
problem" but there isn't, there is only a color problem, Physicists can't
tell us what color anything is.  Sure, they can map color to light, but as
is shown in this video <https://canonizer.com/videos/consciousness/>, that
has nothing to do with something like redness and grenness physical
If you don't like glutamate, (an overly simplified version of Molecular
Materialism <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Molecular-Materialism/36>) then
substitute glutamate with any example in any of the other sub camps to
Qualia Theory <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Representational-Qualia/6>"
of what a computationally bound pixel of elemental redness could be.
Again, if you falsify this (which you believe you have done) then replace
glutamate with the your next best working hypothesis of what redness is.
Keep doing this till you know what it is, that has the redness quality we
can directly experience, then see if others use this same physical stuff to
represent redness with, or do they use something that has your grennes

The point is to describe how to bridge the explanatory gap, eff the
ineffable, and find out what color physical things are in any possible
world, no matter how simple and trivial, in a falsifiable or verifiable way.

Of all the descriptions of stuff in the brain, nobody can tell us the
physical color those abstract descriptions are describing.  Something in
the brain must have the redness quality we can experience.  If you don't
like descriptions of glutamate as it reacts in a synapse, then provide any
other description of something in the brain that could be a description of
something we directly experience as a physical redness quality.  Every time
a talk about glutamate, think about that, instead.  Then since we are
describing the experimental method of not being qualia blind, it is now up
to the experimentalists to find out if it is glutamate, or something you
think might be a better candidate, or something else, different entirely.

As all the experts are saying in "Representational Qualia Theory",
consciousness is "Computationally bound elemental physical qualities in the
brain like redness and grenness."  So, the question is, what are qualia
(what is the color of physical stuff) and how are these computationally



On Sat, Jan 11, 2020 at 12:46 AM Rafal Smigrodzki via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> On Fri, Jan 10, 2020 at 1:36 PM Brent Allsop via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>  We only use a simplified version of the easiest theory to falsify, "elemental
>> qualia are molecular material qualities
>> <https://canonizer.com/topic/88-Molecular-Materialism/36>," is to better
>> help people understand what it means to be qualia blind.  Once people
>> understand how not to be qualia blind with the simplest theory, and they
>> can easily falsify (or verify) that glutamate = redness, they can then
>> do the same for all other more capable theories.  Not being qualia blind is
>> what is required before experimentalists can start to falsify all these
>> competing theories predicting the nature of qualia.  Any theory is
>> justified for being used as a working hypothesis, till it is falsified.
> ### But really, nobody cares! The hypothesis of qualia being "molecular
> properties" is so bad that nobody with even a glimmer of knowledge would
> consider it as a legitimate hypothesis.
> You might want to read some of Eliezer's writings on the generation of
> hypotheses - for a hypothesis to be worth considering, it must already have
> a lot of evidence in favor of it. There is an infinity of hypotheses that
> can be randomly generated but their mere generation is not enough to devote
> computational resources to them.
> Rafal
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